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I. THE STATEMENT OF THE DISTINCTION
The provisions of the Field Civil Code' covering the subjects of surety-
*[Professor of Law, University of Southern California.]
**[Member of the Los Angeles Bar; LL.M., University of Southern California,
1936.]
The authors desire to acknowledge their indebtedness to the following pro-
fessors of law who have -examined the article in proof: Clark Y. Gunderson;
Maurice H. Merrill; George E. Osborne; and Max Radin. Full responsibility for
all statements is retained by the authors.
'David Dudley Field and Alex. W. Bradford, The Civil Code of the State of
New York, Reported Complete by the Commissioners of the Code (Albany, 1865),
§§1534-1572. This code will be cited as Field. Letters of credit are included in the
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ship and guaranty are in force in five States: California,2 Montana, North4
and South Dakota5 and Oklahoma.6 The codification of the two subjects
vitally affects the distinction between them, and the situation in these States
merits separate treatment. Other writers have discussed ably the history
of. the distinction, 7 its origin in the "whimsy of a Massachusetts judge in a
decision a century ago, ' 8 and its nature where not reduced to statutory
form. 9 For refreshment of recollection, and to serve as a basis of com-
parison, the nature of the distinction as developed in the States not having
the Field Code provisions should be noted briefly. Professors Radin and
Merrill have summarized the various text and judicial statements as follows:
"a. A surety is bound upon the same contract or instrument
with the principal.
"A guarantor is bound upon a different contract or instru-
ment from that of the principal.
"b. A surety usually is not discharged either by the creditor's
indulgence to the principal or by want of notice of the principal's
default.
"A guarantor may be discharged by indulgence to the principal
and may be, or is usually, released by want of notice of the prin-
cipal's default.
"c. Principal and surety, being bound upon the same obli-
gation, may be sued jointly.
"The guarantor, being bound by a separate contract, may not
be joined in suit with his principal.
"d. Suretyship is a primary and direct undertaking.
"Guaranty is secondary and collateral.
"e. 'The Statute of Frauds applies to [the surety's] under-
taking, whereas it is inapplicable if he is strictly a joint promisor,
though he is also a surety.'
chapter entitled Suretyship, being covered by §§1573-1581, but will not be treated in
this study, or included in citations of current codes.
In quoting the code, omission of the titles of sections will not be noted. The
section titles did not appear in the Field Code, but were introduced in the California
Civil Code of 1872, adopting the Field Code provisions. Section titles appear in the
other States which now have the Field Code provisions, but are different in each
State, and will not be referred to hereafter.
The Field Code was never adopted in New York, although prepared for the
legislature of that State.2Cal.Civ.Code (1935), §§2787-2854. This code will be cited in the text and
footnotes by giving the numbers of the sections, without reference to the code.3Mont.Rev.Code (1935), §§8171-8209. This code will be cited as Mont.4N.D.Comp.Laws (1913), §§665i-6689. These statutes will be cited as N.D.
5S.D.Comp.Laws (1929), §§1474-1512. These statutes will be cited as S.D.6 Okla.Comp.Stats.Ann. (1921), §§5123-5161. These statutes will be cited as
Okla.7Radin, Guaranty and Suretyship, 17 CAL.L.Rzv. 605 (1929), 18 CAL..L.Rzv. 21
(1929).8 Oxford Bank v. Haynes, 8 Pick. 423, 428 (Mass.1825), discussed in Radin,
Guaranty and Suretyship, 17 CAL.L.REv. 605, 619 (1929).9Rdin, Guaranty and Suretyship, 17 CAL.L.RFv. 605 (1929), 18 CAL.L.REv. 21
(1929); Merrill, Contribution Between Sureties and Guarantors, 2 Idaho L.Jour.
1 (1932). Consult, generally, Morgan, The History and Economics of Suretyship,
12 Corn.L.Quar. 153, 487 (1927). No detailed examination of the effects of the
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"f. The surety undertakes to pay the debt of another.
"The guarantor undertakes to pay if the principal does not or
cannot.
"g. The surety promises to do the same thing which the
principal undertakes.
"The guarantor promises that if the principal does not perform
his agreement, he, the guarantor, will do it for him.
"h. The liability of the surety is immediate and starts with
the agreement.
"The liability of the guarantor is contingent, at the inception
of the agreement, and first becomes absolute upon the principal's
default.
"i. The surety undertakes to pay if the principal does not.
"The guarantor undertakes to pay if the principal cannot.
"j. The surety is an insurer of the debt.
"The guarantor is an insurer of the debtor's solvency.
"k. If consideration moves wholly to the principal, the con-
tract is one of suretyship.
"If consideration is in whole or in part for the benefit of the
intercessor, the contract is one of guaranty.
"1. If the contract defines the time when the promiser is to
assume liability for the debt, his obligation is one of suretyship.
"If the contract fixes no time at which the promiser is to
'assume liability for the debt, his obligation is one of guaranty."'01
Through a process of elimination and consolidation, Professor Merrill
has evolved from the foregoing the following briefer summary of the criteria:
"1. A surety is bound upon the same contract or instrument
with the principal.
"A guarantor is bound upon a different contract or instru-
ment.1
"2. The surety undertakes to pay if the principal does not.
"The guarantor undertakes to pay if the principal cannot.
"3. The 'surety's promise is identical in its terms with that
of the principal.
"The guarantor's promise is conditioned upon nonperformance
by the principal.
"4. Consideration for the surety's promise moves wholly to
the principal.
"Consideration for the guarantor's promise moves wholly or
in part to him.
distinction has been found. The present writers may attempt a subsequent study con-
sidering the effects of the distinction in States not having the Field Code provisions.
I0 Merrill, Contribution Between Sureties and Guarantors, 2 Idaho L.Jour. 1, 8
(1932), 2 Okla. State Bar Jour., #12, p.15 (1932). As stated by Professor Merrill,
the quotation is largely a condensation of the summary compiled by Professor
Radin. Radin, Guaranty and Suretyship, 18 CAL.L.Rxv. 21, 24 (1929).11The origin of "guaranty" from the Latin warrantia, Radin, Guaranty and
Suretyship, 17 CAL.L.Rw. 605, 605 (1929), logically would indicate that a guaranty
forms a part of the same contract
1937]
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"5. A surety's promise defines the time when he is to assume
liability for the debt.
"A guarantor's promise fixes no time at which he is to assume
liability for the debt."' 2 "
Under the Field Code provisions, shortly to be set forth, it will be
noted that "guaranty" includes suretyship. Insofar as any tendency not
to treat the terms as mutually exclusive has been. observed elsewhere, it
has been in the opposite direction."5 Field's adoption of "guaranty" as
the general term represents a departure by him from his first published
draft, in which "suretyship" included "guaranty.'1 4  The definition of
guaranty, as presented in the final form of the code, follows almost com-
pletely the language of the fourth section of the Statute of Frauds,"5 read-
ing as follows:
"A guaranty is a promise to answer for the debt, default, or
miscarriage of another person." 6
A surety is defined:
"A surety is one who
[a] at the request of another,
[b] and for the purpose of securing to him a benefit,
[c] becomes responsible for the performance by the latter of
some act in favor of a third person,
[d] or hypothecates property as security therefor."'"
The outstanding departure of these definitions from the condition of
the law in the other States is the inclusion of suretyship in guaranty. This
change is emphasized further by the code titles. Title XIII is "Guaranty,"
and under it are two chapters, "Guaranty in General," and "Suretyship."1 8
12Merrill, Contribution Between Sureties and Guarantors, 2 Idaho L.Jour. 1, 12
(1932), 2 Okla. State Bar Jour., #12, p.15 (1932).
13Radin, Guaranty and Suretyship, 18 CAL.L.REv. 21, 22 n.7 (1929); Arant on
Suretyship (1931), 6.
34§§1360 and 1377 of the first draft read: "A surety is one who becomes liable
for the performance by another person of the obligation of such other person, or
who assumes an obligation for the benefit of another person and at his request."
"A guaranty is a contract of suretyship whereby the surety engages to satisfy the
obligation of the principal, if the principal fails to do so himself." Draft of a Civil
Code for the State of New York; Prepared by the Commissioners of the Code, and
Submitted to the Judges and -Others for Examination Prior to Revision by the
Commissioners (Albany, 1862); discussed in Radin, Guaranty and Suretyship, 18
CAL.L.REv. 21, 23 (1929). In the first draft, the titles Suretyship and Guaranty are
correspondingly reversed. Discussed in Radin, Guaranty and Suretyship, 18 CAL.L.
REv. 21, 23 (1929). In his notes on the final draft, Field said that guaranty "of
course includes a contract of suretyship, but every guarantor is not necessarily a
surety." Field and Bradford, The Civil Code of the State of New York (Albany,
1865), §1534n.; discussed in Radin, Guaranty and Suretyship, 18 CAL.L.REv. 21, 22
(1929).
15 The only difference is the omission by Field of "special" before "promise."
Discussed, Radin, Guaranty and Suretyship, 18 CA.L.REv. 21, 22 (1929).
16Field §1534; Cal. §2787; Mont. §8171; N.D. §6651; Okla. §5123; S.D. §1474.1 7Field §1558; Cal. §2831; Mont. §8195; N.D. §6675; Okla. §5147; S.D. §1498.
For convenience of discussion the definition has been presented in tabular form,
with parentheses inserted.
28 In California the title and chapter headings are preserved as in the Field
code. In the other States having the Field code provisions the title headings have
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So far as has been observed, in only one case has a court noted that the
terms as used in the code are not mutually exclusive.19 In discussing the
effects of the distinction, the present writers in general will follow the
practice of the courts, and employ the terms as though delimited from
each other. Before proceeding to consider the effects, it is felt that a
detailed examination of the various aspects and implications of the code
definitions is necessary.20 As it is desired that this be done thoroughly, the
reader's indulgence is craved if at times the discussion shall seem to be
meticulous. It is believed that the reader who does not fall by the wayside
will become convinced that, in attempting to ascertain the state of the law
under these statutory provisions, it is easy to fall into error if they are not
kept constantly in mind. Under the code definitions it is not left to the
parties to determine whether a secondary obligation shall be one of surety-
ship or of guaranty. It seems that any terminology indicating which type
is intended is not controlling,2 1 and that an express stipulation is unavailing.
With suretyship a subdivision of guaranty, every problem must be ap-
proached from the standpoint of an assumption that a guaranty only is
involved, unless some basis can be found for also placing the particular
obligation in the more limited category of suretyships. As far as the present
writers recall, the universal practice of the courts in all States is to the
contrary, i.e., to assume that the situation is one of suretyship,22 where
the parties have not made any indication through their terminology of an
intent to create a guaranty, and there are no other special circumstances
been eliminated, and the material on guaranty and suretyship divided into chap-
ters, or, in Oklahoma, articles, as follows: Montana: c.174, Guaranty-Definition,
Creation, and Interpretation; c.175, Liability and Exoneration of Guarantors-Con-
tinuing Guaranty; c.176, Suretyship-Sureties and Their Liability; c.177, Rights
of Sureties and Creditors, North Dakota: c.84, Guaranty; c.85, Suretyship;
Oklahoma: Art. VIII, Guaranty; Art. IX, Suretyship; South Dakota: c.13,
Guaranty; c.14, Suretyship.191n Alexander v. Bosworth, 26 Cal.App. 589, 595, 147 Pac. 607, 610 (1915),
it was pointed out that the relation of a wife to her husband's transaction came
within the language of both definitions.
In Mahana v. Alexander, 88 Cal.App. 111, 117, 263 Pac. 260, 263 (1927), Mr.
Justice Hart criticized usage strictly in accordance with the code definitions:
. . .In many of the cases dealing with suretyship contracts the word 'guar-
antee' is obviously used in its colloquial and not in its technical sense, as, for
illustration, 'the surety, by his contract, guarantees,' stating the nature of his
obligation or what he has agreed to do."20krofessor Radin has included a brief discussion of the code definitions in
his excellent article. Radin, Guaranty and Suretyship, 18 CAL.L.REv. 21, 21-23 (1929).21In Cawston Ostrich Farm v. Salomon, 72 Cal.App. 550, 558, 237 Pac. 808,
811 (1925), in which the assignor of a lease assumed secondary liability for the
payment of rent, Mr. Presiding Justice Conrey said: "On the facts of this case,
Cawston Ostrich Farm is a surety for the principal obligor, and it is of no
consequence that the word 'guarantees' was used in making the promise."
In Bailey Loan Co. v. Seward, 9 S.D. 326, 331, 69 N.W. 58, 60 (1896), Mr.
Presiding Judge Corson said: "But, while the defendants . . . used the term
'guaranty' in their contract, it would seem that they were, under our Code, sureties,
assuming, as it is apparently conceded, that they executed the guaranty to give
credit to the principal debtor, and not for any benefit to themselves."22For example, when the purchaser of property assumes the payment of an
incumbrance.
1937]
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present.23  "Guaranty" is defined by Field as a promise, whereas a "surety"
is a person. These definitions are in harmony with ordinary usage, but
under his scheme of organization result in defining a subdivision of a
category of promises by describing a person.
Under the code, in order to have a surety, it is necessary to satisfy
the requirements of clauses (a) and (b) of the definition-the obligation
must be assumed "at the request of another," and "for the purpose of se-
curing to him a benefit." Clause (c) makes it clear that "another" and "him"
refer to the principal debtor-the surety "becomes responsible for the
performance by the latter [the principal debtor] of some act in favor of a
third person."
As it thus is required that the obligation be assumed at the request
of the principal debtor, the conclusion is inescapable that if it is assumed
at the request of the creditor, that is, the obligee, the situation is one of
guaranty only, and not of suretyship. This applies to all fidelity bonds
secured by banks or other concerns covering their employees. Also in-
cluded are cases where the creditor requests a landlord to stand back of
his tenant, or asks a husband, wife, friend or relative of the principal to
assume secondary liability.2 In many situations it will be a matter of
chance whether the request is made by the creditor or by the debtor,
26
but nevertheless the difference is made vital in the present connection. No
logical basis for the distinction can be seen.
Professor Radin says that such an interpretation of the code definition
is "obviously nonsense." 26  The remark is apposite, but hardly serves to
distinguish this part of the subject from any other in this legal "Alice-in-
Wonderland" situation. At any rate, the provisions under discussion are
the law of the land in five sovereign States, and presumably are to be taken
seriously. The results indicate the dangers inherent in large scale codifica-
tion.
In order to have a surety it is also necessary to satisfy the require-
ment of clause (b), that the obligation be assumed "for the purpose of se-
curing to him [the principal debtor] a benefit." Under a familiar canon of
construction, these words must, if possible, be interpreted so as to add
2 3As examples of such circumstances, the following may be noted: Any
reference to collectibility or solvency creates a "guaranty of collection." If con-
tinuing, the secondary obligation is assumed to be a guaranty, again because of
familiar terminology (but see footnote #51 infra.). In order to have a guaranty, it
frequently suffices that the secondary party signs upon the back of the instru-
ment, or upon a separate one, rather than with the principal upon the face.24In the history of the distinction between suretyship and guaranty it has
been said many times that the suretyship obligation is primary, and that of the
guarantor secondary, but the present writers refuse to be restricted by such obtuse
terminology. Both are secondary, and will be so referred to.2 5If the creditor tells the principal that a certain person must assume secondary
liability, and the principal induces him to do so, the situation is one of surety-
ship; if the creditor goes to the secondary party directly, a guaranty results.2GRadin, Guaranty and Suretyship, 18 CAL.L.Rmv. 21, 22 (1929).
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something to the definition. If "purpose" refers merely to the contemplation
of the parties that the carrying out of the transaction will be of some
advantage to the principal debtor, the clause is without effect, as the
principal debtor does not enter into transactions unless such is the case.
The only exception to this would be the extremely unlikely situation where
the principal is an accommodation party for the benefit of the one assuming
secondary liability. This remote contingency may be dismissed from fur-
ther consideration. We are therefore led to adopt the alternative, and
much more plausible, interpretation which is possible, namely, that "purpose"
refers to the subjective motive of the secondary party which induces him to
assume liability, whether to benefit the principal or himself, that is, whether
he is a gratuitous or a compensated party, only the former satisfying the
definition.27
If this interpretation is adopted, no surety company is ever a surety.2
At first glance this seems to be another instance of a conclusion which is
"obviously nonsense." However, it fits in with the general plan of the
code provisions to constitute sureties a privileged class of guarantors, enjoy-
ing special protections against liability. In addition to the specific provisions
inserted for the benefit of sureties, it is provided that a surety "has all
the rights of a guarantor," 29 and that he is exonerated "in like manner with
a guarantor."30  The efficacy of the provisions as to sureties in giving them
added advantages will be examined later, but if certain secondary parties
27 Cole Mfg. Co. v. Morton, 24 Mont. 61, 60 Pac. 587 (1900); Bailey Loan
Co. v. Seward, 9 S.D. 326, 331, 69 N.W. 58, 60 (1896), quoting Field's note, set
forth in the text, infra, at footnote #31.
Under another code section, if the obligation of the principal is antecedent,
and there is a consideration to the secondary party from any source, the promise
of the latter "is deemed an original obligation of the promisor, and need not be
in writing." Field §1538(3) ; Cal. §2794(3) ; Mont. §8175(3) ; N.D. §6655(3);
Okla. §5127(3); S.D. §1478(3). Notwithstanding the use of the expression "prin-
cipal obligor," it is believed to be clear that the only effect of the provision is to
create an exception to the requirement of a writing under the Statute of Frauds,
of which the provision is a part, particularly as the preceding section provides that,
except as prescribed by the section quoted, a "guaranty" must be in writing. If
application of the canon expressio unis, which will be discussed later in the text,
is avoided here, the sections referred to, being in the chapter relating to guaran-
ties in general, throw no light upon the distinction between guaranty and surety-
ship. It should be added that, in the section quoted, stating the exceptions to
the requirement of a writing, obligations are included which are not secondary.
It is believed that, while this militates against the soundness of the reasoning
adopted herein, it does not destroy it.28It is hardly necessary to state that this has not been followed by the courts.
For example, in Clark County v. Howard, 58 S.D. 457, 459, 237 N.W. 561, 562(1931), involving the liability of a surety company, after referring to the defini-
tions of suretyship and guaranty, Mr. Commissioner Miser stated that the two
subjects "are defined, not by the two sections 1474 and 1498 alone, but by the entire
chapters of which these sections are parts and by the decisions of this and other
courts," and concluded: "Appellant herein contracted as a surety."
It has been pointed out that, under the Field Code provisions, fidelity bonds
secured by employers are guaranties, for another reason.20Field §1565; Cal. §2844; Mont. §8202; N.D. §6682; Okla. §5154; S.D. §150S
3OField §1564(1); Cal. §2840(1); Mont. §8201(1); N.D. §6681(l): Okla.
§5153(1); S.D. §1504(1).
1937]
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are to have a specially privileged position there is reason for selecting gra-
tuitous ones as the beneficiaries. Field, in his notes on the code, stated
that such a distinction is intended:
"The distinction between a surety and a mere guarantor is, that
the former enters into the contract primarily for the benefit of the
debtor, while with the latter the benefit of the principal debtor is no
material part of the inducement to him to contract."'81
Such a distinction is in line with the tendency in a number of jurisdic-
tions to require more extensive alterations of the contract between the
creditor and the principal to release compensated sureties than to discharge
those who are gratuitous.82 The Supreme Court of California, wisely,
though, in view of the code, somewhat paradoxically, has refused to make
such a distinction. 3 It must be remembered that the discrimination in
favor of gratuitous sureties can operate only when the obligation is as-
sumed at the request of the principal debtor. It will be remembered that
under clause (a) of the definition, if the request proceeds from the creditor,
all secondary parties are nerely guarantors.
Clauses (c) and (d), which are in the disjunctive, and dependent upon
compliance with the requirements of clauses (a) and (b), cover personal
and real suretyship-the surety "[c] becomes responsible for the per-
formance by the' latter [the principal debtor] of some act in favor of a
third person, or [d] hypothecates property as security therefor." Clause
(c) refers to "some act," whereas the definition of a guaranty refers to
a "debt, default, or miscarriage"-"A guaranty is a promise to answer for
the debt, default, or miscarriage of another person"--but it is believed
that this divergence in form of statement is immaterial.
The situation in regard to the hypothecation of property presents some
interesting questions. It must again be kept in mind that, under clauses
(a) and (b), suretyship can exist only when the secondary obligation is
81Field and Bradford, The Civil Code of the State of New York (Albany,
1865), §1558 n.; discussed in Radin, Guaranty and Suretyship, 18 CAL.L.REv. 21,
23 (1929).32 For example, in Chapman v. Hoage, 296 U.S. 526, 531, 56 Sup.Ct. 333, 335,
80 L.Ed. 370, 373-374 (1936), Mr. Justice Stone, citing numerous cases, said: "One
who engages in the business of insurance for compensation may properly be held
more rigidly to his obligation to indemnify the insured than one whose suretyship
is an undertaking uncompensated and casual." The draft of a codificatory abolition
of the distinction between suretyship and guaranty, which will be set forth at the
end of this article, puts both classes of sureties upon the same basis. Compara-
tive lack of sympathy for the compensated surety should not lead courts to under-
take the task of building up two bodies of suretyship law, one for the compensated
surety and the other for the gratuitous.88In First Cong. Church of Christ v. Lowrey, 175 Cal. 124, 126, 165 Pac. 440,
441 (1917), Mr. Justice Henshaw said: "It is to be noted, then, that neither our
statute law nor our decisions under it have ever recognized that there is any dis-
tinction between a compensated and uncompensated surety or guarantor, nor be-
tween a corporate surety and an individual surety, nor between a corporation or an
individual engaging in the business of suretyship or guarantyship for compensation
and a corporation or individual who enters into a like contract without compensa-
tion. To impose such distinctions, while sections 2819 and 2840, Civil Code [Field
[Vol. 10
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assumed at the request of the principal, and when it is gratuitous. If either
of these features is absent, the situation is one of guaranty only. Whenever
the latter is the case, we therefore have, in connection with the hypotheca-
tion of property, "real guaranty"-a conception new to legal science. The
expression "real suretyship" is an old one; and, by reason of familiarity
with it, the courts in all States uniformly have assumed that the hypotheca-
tion of property presents a situation of suretyship rather than of guaranty.8 4
There is also another difficulty in connection with the use of property.
The definition of guaranty refers to a "promise"-"A guaranty is a promise
to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another person." The
word "promise" indicates that there must be a promisor, that is, that
there must be someone assuming personal secondary liability.35 In the
present connection this could be none other than the owner of the prop-
erty. Mr. Justice Lorigan, of the Supreme Court of California, said: "A
guaranty imports a personal liability exclusively." 36  An assumption of
personal liability does not occur in a situation described as the hypothecation
of property, without more;S7 and the code definition of surety sets off
§§1551 & 1564; Mont. §§8188 & 8201; N.D. §§6668 & 6681; Okla. §§5140 & 5153;
S.D. §§1491 & 1504], read as they now read upon the books, would not be to
interpret and to enforce the written law, but to make new law in hostility to it.
It is for the Legislature, and not for the courts, to modify our statute law, if
the lawmaking body shall believe that its former declarations touching the rights
and liabilities of sureties and guarantors should be modified in respect to those
sureties and guarantors who become such for compensation."
However, in Turner v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 187 Cal. 76, 85, 200 Pac. 959,
962 (1921), Mr. Justice Sloane said: "In the matter of the obligations of corpora-
tions organized to execute surety bonds and securities as a business there is a
growing disposition in the courts to hold such sureties to their obligations unless
there has been some material departure from the conditions of the agreement."
In Hunstock v. Royal Securities Corp., 51 Cal.App. 769, 774, 197 Pac. 963, 965(1921), Mr. Justice James said: "While there seems to be no occasion for invok-
ing the exception to the rule in this case, it may be remarked that the tenor of
more recent authorities is to hold that surety companies issuing their obligations
for a price, and being in the business of furnishing bonds, are less entitled to
insist that they stand as favorites under the law than those who become bound as
a matter of friendly accommodation." This statement was quoted with approval
in Ramish v. Astor, 5 Cal.App. (2d) 225, 226, 42 Pac. (2d) 334, 334-335 (1935). Contra,
see Cormack, Review of Stearns:' Suretyship, 9 SouTHEmR CALiroRNiA LAW RE-
VIEW 295 (1936).
I 41n like manner, the familiar terminology of "guaranty of collection," and
"continuing guaranty" (but see footnote #51, infra), has been decisive.
35Where a wife joined with her husband in a deed of trust upon her separate
property to secure the performance of an obligation assumed by him, the problem
being one of extension of time, it was properly held to be immaterial whether her
contract was one of guaranty or of suretyship. It was pointed out that her
relation to the transaction came within the definitions both of guaranty and surety-
ship. Alexander v. Bosworth, 26 Cal.App. 589, 595, 147 Pac. 607, 610 (1915).
36Sather Banking Co. v. Briggs Co., 138 Cal. 724, 729, 72 Pac. 352, 353 (1903).
The case involved a deed given as a security by a director and stockholder of a
corporation to secure payment of future indebtedness. It was argued that the
grantor was liable as a continuing guarantor, but the court held that the situation
was one of real suretyship.
37When property is put up in connection with an assumption of personal liabil-
ity, it is assumed that the situation as to the property is governed by the nature of
the personal obligation.
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the hypothecation of property against the assumption of personal liability38
Strength is lent to the inference of a code requirement of personal liability in
connection with guaranty, by the reference to the debt, default, or miscar-
riage "of another person," also by the fact that the following section com-
mences, "A person" may become guarantor--"A person may become
guarantor even without the knowledge or consent of the principal." 80
Throughout the chapter on "Guaranty in General, '40 setting forth the pro-
visions as to guaranties which are not suretyships, there are references to
the guarantor, and none to the hypothecation of property. Coupled with
these features of this chapter, are the provisions in the chapter on surety-
ship expressly referring to hypothecation, from which an added inference
can be drawn that the hypothecation of property is conceived always to be
a matter of suretyship. This is particularly true in regard to the section
reading:
"Whenever property of a surety is hypothecated with property of
the principal, the surety is entitled to have the property of the
principal first applied to the discharge of the obligation." 41
There is no corresponding provision with regard to guaranties in general,
and it is inconceivable that it should be intended that this form of equitable
relief should not be available to any person who has put up his property
as security for the obligation of another.
If it is to be concluded that personal liability is essential to the crea-
tion of a mere guaranty, then, in accordance with what previously has been
noted, if property is hypothecated without an assumption of such liability,
either at the request of the creditor or for consideration to the owner of the
property, the situation is one neither of suretyship nor of guaranty. This
result can be avoided by treating the hypothecation of property, in our
newly discovered "real guaranty," as merely involving a limitation upon the
personal liability of the one making the promise of guaranty, that is, that
he is not to be liable except to the extent of the proceeds of the property.42
This method of escape from the dilemma is somewhat strained, as it would
indicate that the guarantor could sell the property at any time, and for the
further reason that the usual conception, as indicated by the term "real"
suretyship, is that one putting up property does not assume personal lia-
bility, but merely lets his property stand as security. He may assume re-
sponsibility in connection with the care and disposition of the property,
but this is not conceived of as personal liability for performance of the
obligation as such.
3sVide clauses (c) and (d).89Field §1535; Cal. §2788; Mont. §8172; N.D. §6652; Okla. §5124; S.D. §1475.
40See footnote #18, supra, for titles in States other than California.41Field §1571; Cal. §2850; Mont. §8208; N.D. §6688; Okla. §5160; S.D. §1511.42Where a mortgage was given without assumption of personal liability, it was
held that "the land described in the mortgage became the guarantor of the payment
of the note." Carson v. Reid, 137 Cal. 253, 255, 70 Pac. 89, 90 (1902).
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It may be assumed, in conclusion, that a court will find some way to
interpret the code provisions so as to consider the hypothecation of property,
at the request of the creditor or for consideration to the owner, as constitut-
ing either "real suretyship" or "real guaranty"-if worked out as a matter
of statutory interpretation choice of the latter would seem to be indicated.43
If it should be felt impossible to find the situation to be one of either surety-
ship or guaranty under the code, the court would then be confronted with
the necessity of developing legal principles to apply to the newly discovered
sui generis situation, without the- intervention of the code, and no doubt
familiar results would be reached. Being free from the code restrictions, as
between suretyship and guaranty the rules applicable to ihe former would be
preferred, because of the predilection, already noted,44 for "real suretyship."
II. THE CODE PROVISIONS IN GENERAL
As only the section numbers of the California Civil Code will be given
in the text, the following cross reference table is inserted for the convenience
of those who desire to locate provisions in the Field Code or in that of
another State.
Field46  Cal.46  Mont.47 N.D.48  Okla.49  S.D. 50
1534 2787 8171 6651 5123 1474
1535 2788 8172 6652 5124 1475
1536 2792 8173 6653 5125 1476
1537 2793 8174 6654 5126 1477
1538 2794 8175 6655 5127 1478
1539 2795 8176 6656 5128 1479
1540 2799 8177 6657 5129 1480
1541 2800 8178 6658 5130 1481
1542 2801 8179 6659 5131 1482
1543 2802 8180 6660 5132 1483
1544 2806 8181 6661 5133 1484
1545 2807 8182 6662 5134 1485
1546 2808 8183 6663 5135 1486
1547 2809 8184 6664 5136 1487
1548 2810 8185 6665 5137 1488
1549 2814 8186 6666 5138 1489
1550 2815 8187 6667 5139 1490
1551 2819 8188 6668 5140 1491
1552 2820 8189 6669 5141 1492
4 3Violation of the seeming restriction upon guaranties to situations involving
personal liability would be less objectionable than to disregard the clearly stated
restrictions upon the limited category of guaranties which are defined as suretyships.44In the third preceding paragraph, supra.
46Field and Bradford, The Civil Code of the State of New York (Albany,
1865) iCal.Civ.Code (1935).
47Mont.Rev.Code (1935).
48N.D.Comp.Laws (1913).
490kla.Comp.Stats.Ann. (1921).
5OS.D.Comp.Laws (1929).
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Field 45
1553
1554
1555
1556
1557
1558
1559
1560
1561
1562
1563
1564
1565
1566
1567
1568
1569
1570
1571
1572
Cal. 46
2821
2822
2823
2824
2825
2831
2832
2836
2837
2838
2839
2840
2844
2845
2846
2847
2848
2849
2850
2854
Mont.4 7
8190
8191
8192
8193
8194
8195
8196
8197
8198
8199
8200
8201
8202
8203
8204
8205
8206
8207
8208
8209
N.D.48
6670
6671
6672
6673
6674
6675
6676
6677
6678
6679
6680
6681
6682
6683
6684
6685
-6686
6687
6688
6689
Okla.49
5142
5143
5144
5145
5146
5147
5148
5149
5150
5151
5152
5153
5154
5155
5156
5157
5158
5159
5160
5161
S.D.50
1493
1494
1495
1496
1497
1498
1499
1500
1501
1502
1503
1504
1505
1506
1507
1508
1509
1510
1511
1512
The code provisions on the subjects of suretyship and guaranty afford
no evidence that Field was aware of the nature of the distinction between
the two which he created through the form in which he cast his definitions.
The following possibly over-simplified comparative outline of the code
sections may be useful for purposes of reference, and will indicate the
fragmentary character of the provisions:
"GUARANTY IN GENERAL"'
Cd.Civ.Code
§2787
2788
2792
2793
2794
2795
2799
2800
2801
2802
2806
definition
knowledge of principal not
necessary
consideration-necessity of
writing-generally required
Statute of Frauds exceptions
acceptance
incomplete contract
guaranty of collection
where efforts hopeless
out of state
deemed unconditional
2807 when liable
2808 conditional obligation-
notice of default
2809 not beyond principal's
ligation
2810 illegal contractit personal disability
"SURETYSHIP"j
Cal.Civ.Code
§2831 definition
2832 apparent principal
2845 Pain v. Packard
2837 usual interpretation
2838 judgment against surety
2836 not beyond express terms
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"GUAxANTY IN GENERAL" "SURETYSHIP"
Cal.Civ.Code Cal.Civ.Code
2814 continuing guaranty
2815 revocation
2819 exoneration-alteration, im- 2839 exoneration-performance
pairment or suspension of 2840
rights (1) like guarantor
(2) prejudice
(3) omission of required act
2844 rights of guarantor
2846 may compel principal to per-
form
2820 void or voidable
2821 rescission-of alteration, etc.
2822 partial satisfaction
2823 mere delay by creditor
2824 indemnified guarantor2825 operation of law 2847 indemnity from principal
2848 subrogation and contribution
2849
2854
2850 principal's property first
III. THE ROLE OF EXPRESSIO UNIs
In interpreting the body of code provisions in regard to suretyship and
guaranty, it is possible to apply "expressio unis" reasoning in three ways:
(1) To exclude from applicability to guaranties in general all pro-
visions inserted only as to sureties;
(2) To exclude from applicability to sureties all matters stated only
as to guaranties in general;
(3) To exclude from applicability to sureties all matters stated only
as to guaranties in general other than those relating to methods of ex-
oneration and rights.
As sureties are made a class of guarantors, it would seem that the
second of the above possibilities, to exclude from application to sureties all
provisions relating to guaranties in general, may be rejected at once. 1
This conclusion is reinforced by several factors: nearly all the code pro-
51In denying the necessity of demand upon the principal in an action against
sureties, Mr. Justice Paterson said: ". . . Sections 2806 and 2807 of the Civil
Code [Field §§1544 & 1545; Mont. §§8181 & 8182; N.D. §§6661 & 6662; Okla. §§5133
& 5134; S.D. §§1484 & 1485], . . . in the absence of anything in the contract
calling for a demand, render the liabilities of the sureties absolute." Coburn v.
Brooks, 78 Cal. 443, 448, 21 Pac. 2, 4 (1889). In a suit upon a continuing secondary
liability, Mr. Justice Shaw said: "Although technically a contract of suretyship, it
is governed by the same rule as a continuing contract of guaranty under section 2815
of the Civil Code [Field §1550; Mont. §8187; N.D. §6667; Okla. §5139; S.D. §1490]."
White Sewing Machine Co. v. Courtney, 141 Cal. 674, 676, 75 Pac. 296, 297 (1904).
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visions relating either to guarantors in general or to sureties are inserted
for their protection; the character of the provisions in regard to sureties
is such as to indicate an intent to extend to them cetain additional ad-
vantages; and the provisions in regard to sureties are much less complete
in scope than those as to guarantors in general. A contrary result has,
nevertheless, been reached in South Dakota.52
Logic would seem to require adoption of the first possible application
of expressio unis, the exclusion as to guarantors in general of matters
inserted only as to sureties. As it is the purpose of the code to give
sureties special advantages, it would seem clear that it is conceived that
any privilege or protection expressly stated only as to them is not also
to be enjoyed by guarantors in general. This would exclude application
to the latter of the following sections:
"2832. 53 One who appears to be a principal, whether by the
terms of a written instrument or otherwise, may show that he is
in fact a surety, except as against persons who have acted on the
faith of his apparent character of principal."
"2836.54 A surety cannot be held beyond the express terms
of his contract, and if such contract prescribes a penalty for its
breach, he cannot in any case be liable for more than the
penalty." 5
"2838. 55 Notwithstanding the recovery of judgment by a
creditor against a surety, the latter still occupies the relation of
surety.
52Clark County v. Howard, 58 S.D. 457, 459, 237 N.W. 561, 562 (1931). Mr.
Commissioner Miser stated: ". . . Section 1485 [Field §1545; Cal. §2807; Mont.
§81-82; N.D. §6662; Okla. §5134] in the chapter on guaranty applies to guarantors
and not to sureties." The learned commissioner previously had reasoned that the
two terms are defined not only by the code definitions but also "by the entire chap-
ters of which these sections are parts and by the decisions of this and other courts."
It should be noted that, in South Dakota, there is no general title "Guaranties in
General," but only chapters entitled "Guaranty" and "Suretyship." As to titles in
other States, see footnote #18, supra. The section in question reads: "A guarantor
of payment of performance is liable to the guarantee immediately upon the default
of the principal, and without demand or notice."
Certain loose language at the beginning of the third paragraph of the opinion
in Parrish v. Rosebud Min. & Mill Co., 7 Cal.Unrep. 117, 121, 71 Pac. 694, 695
(1903), is also subject to the interpretation that it indicates that provisions stated
only in the chapter on guaranty in general do not apply to sureties.53Field §1559; Mont. §8196; N.D. §6676; Okla. §5148; S.D. §1499. The reader
is reminded that section numbers in the text or footnotes (other than in quotations)
refer to the California Civil Code (1935) unless othervise indicated. As to section
titles, see footnote #1, supra.54Field §1560; Mont. §8197; N.D. §677; Okla. §5149; S.D. §1500.
54A§2837 (Field §1561; Mont. §8198; N.D. §678; Okla. §5150; S.D. §1501) pro-
vides, as to sureties: "In interpreting the terms of a contract of suretyship, the same
rules are to be observed as in the case of other contracts." The same result seems
to be reached by §§2808 & 2809 (Field §§1546 & 1547; Mont. §§8183 & 8184; N.D.§§6663 & 6634; Okla. §§5135 & 5136; S.D. §§1486 & 1487) as to guaranties in gen-
eral: "2808. Where one guarantees a conditional obligation, his liability is commen-
surate with that of the principal . . . 2809. The obligation of a guarantor must
be neither larger in amount nor in other respects more burdensome than that of the
principal; and if in its terms it exceeds it, it is reducible in proportion to the prin-
cipal obligation."
55Field §1562; Mont. §8199; N.D. §679; Okla. §5151; S.D. §1502.
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"2839.56 Performance of the principal obligation, or an offer
of such performance, duly made as provided in this code, ex-
onerates a surety. ' 6A
"2845.57 A surety may require his creditor to proceed against
the principal, or to pursue any other remedy in his power which
the surety cannot himself pursue, and which would lighten his
burden; and if in such case the creditor neglects to do so, the
surety is exonerated to the extent to which he is thereby prejudiced.
"2846.8 A surety may compel his principal to perform the
obligation when due.
"2847.59 If a surety satisfies the principal obligation, or any
part thereof, whether with or without legal proceedings, the prin-
cipal is bound to reimburse what he has disbursed, including neces-
sary costs and expenses; but the surety has no claim for reim-
bursement against other persons, though they may have been bene-
fited by his act, except as prescribed by the next section.
"2848.0 A surety, upon satisfying the obligation of the prin-
cipal, is entitled to enforce every remedy which the creditor then
has against the principal to the extent of reimbursing what he has
expended, and also to require all his co-sureties to contribute
thereto, without regard to the order of time in which they became
such.
"2849.61 A surety is entitled to the benefit of every security for
the performance of the principal obligation held by the creditor,
or by a co-surety at the time of entering into the contract of
suretyship, or acquired by him afterwards, whether the surety
was aware of the security or not.
56Field §1563; Mont. §8200; N.D. §6680; Okla. §5152; S.D. §1503.
56APart performance is covered, as to guaranties in general, by §2822 (Field
§1554; Mont. §8191; N.D. §6671; Okla. §5143; S.D. §1494): "The acceptance, by a
creditor, of anything in partial satisfaction of an obligation, reduces the obligation
of a guarantor thereof, in [Cal., "is"] the same measure as that of the principal, but
does not otherwise affect it."
§2840(2) (Field §1564 [2] ; Mont. §8201 [2] ; N.D. §6681 [2] ; Okla. §5153 [2];
S.D. §1504 [2]) provides, as to sureties: "A surety is exonerated . . . 2. To the
extent to which he is prejudiced by any act of the creditor which would naturally
prove injurious to the remedies of the surety or inconsistent with his rights, or
which lessens his security."
The same result would seem to be reached, as to guaranties in general, by
§2819 (Field §1551; Mont. §8188; N.D. §6; Okla. §5140; S.D. §1491): "A guar-
antor is exonerated, except so far as he may be indemnified by the principal, if by
any act of the creditor, without the consent of the guarantor, the original obligation
of the principal is altered in any respect, or the remedies or rights of the creditor
against the principal, in respect thereto, in any way impaired or suspended."
§2840 (3) (Field §1564 [3] ; Mont. §8201 [3] ; N.D. §6681 [3] ; Okla. §5153 [3];
S.D. §1504 [3]) provides, as to sureties: "A surety is exonerated . . . 3. To the
extent to which he is prejudiced by an omission of the creditor to do anything, when
required by the surety, which it is his duty to do." This seems to add nothing to
the effect of §2845 (Field §1566; Mont. §8203; N.D. §6683; Okla. §5155; S.D. §1506),
which will be quoted in the text.57Field §1566; Mont. §8203; N.D. §6683; Okla. §5155; S.D. §1506.58SField §1567; Mont. §8204; N.D. §6684; Okla. §5156; S.D. §1507.
59Field §1568; Mont. §8205; N.D. §6685; Okla. §5157; S.D. §1508.60Field §1569; Mont. §8206; N.D. §6686; Okla. §5158; S.D. §1509.61Field §1570; Mont. §8207; N.D. §6687; Okla. §5159; S.D. §1510.
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"2850.62 Whenever property of a surety is hypothecated with
property of the principal, the surety is entitled to have the prop-
erty of the principal first applied to the discharge of the obliga-
tion."
"2854.6 A creditor is entitled to the benefit of everything
which a surety has received from the debtor by way of security
for the performance of the obligation, and may, upon the ma-
turity of the obligation, compel the application of such security to
its satisfaction."
Of the foregoing sections, 2832 and 2845 may be considered reasonable
applications of the plan of the code to extend special privileges to sure-
ties.64 As to the provisions set forth in the other sections, it is believed
that their nature is such as to indicate with sufficient clarity that their
application will not be confined to sureties.65 In interpreting the code
definitions, the present writers have not been deterred from reaching con-
clusions which are "obviously nonsense." It is felt, however, that the
maxim "expressio unis," constituting only a general guide to the ascer-
tainment of intention, and being much less compelling than direct state-
ments, particularly in definitions, must yield when its application would
produce such utterly absurd results.
The third possible use of the canon is to exclude from application
to sureties all matters stated only as to guarantors in general, other than
those relating to methods of exoneration and rights. It is provided in the
chapter on sureties:
"2840.66 A surety is exonerated-
"1. In like manner with a guarantor; .
"2844.67 A surety has all the rights of a guarantor, whether
he become personally responsible or not."
These sections would indicate that all other provisions as to guarantors in
general are not to be used in connection with sureties, and that the maxim
may be applied here. If this is to be done, a difficult question is presented
as to when. "rights," or methods of exoneration, are created. If the
character of a provision, e.g., in regard to interpretation of contracts, is
such that it may give rise to a defense in behalf of a party, is there created
in him a "right," or a method of exoneration? Or must there be a
granting of authority to him to take some sort of action? The broad sense
62Field §1571; Mont. §8208; N.D. §6688; Okla. §5160; S.D. §1511.63Field §1572; Mont. §8209; N.D. §6689; Okla. §5161; S.D. §1512.64As to §2845, see IV. 14. Request to Proceed Against Principal, at footnote
#130, infra.65A dictum has limited the application of §§2849 & 2850 to sureties. Mr.
justice Henshaw, in Adams v. Wallace, 119 Cal. 67, 70, 51 Pac. 14, 15 (1897).
For purposes of attachment it has been held that a guaranty of a debt secured
by deed of trust of another is not secured, because §2850 is limited to sureties.
Kelley v. Goldschmidt, 47 Cal.App. 38, 42, 190 Pac. 55, 57 (1920).66Field §1564; Mont. §8201; N.D. §6681; Okla. §5153; S.D. §1504.67Field §1565; Mont. §8202; N.D. §6682; Okla. §5154; S.D. §1505.
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in which "exonerate" is used in Section 2840, supra, as a whole," in-
dicates adoption of the former view. If so, obviously there is nothing left
upon which the principle of exclusion can operate, except provisions ad-
verse to guarantors in general, among which are the following:
"2806.69 A guaranty is to be deemed unconditional unless its
terms import some condition precedent to the liability of the
guarantor.
"2807.70 A guarantor of payment or performance is liable to
the guarantee immediately upon the default of the principal, and
without demand or notice."
"2810.71  A guarantor . is liable notwithstanding any
mere personal disability of the principal, though the disability be
such as to make the contract void against the principal."
"2820.72 A promise by a creditor, which for any cause is
void, or voidable by him at his option, does not alter the obligation
or suspend or impair the remedy, within the meaning of the last
section."
"2823.78 Mere delay on the part of a creditor to proceed
against the principal, or to enforce any other remedy, does not
exonerate a guarantor.
"2824. 74 A guarantor, who has been indemnified by the prin-
cipal, is liable to the creditor to the extent of the indemnity, not-
withstanding that the creditor, without the assent of the guarantor,
may have modified the contract or released the principal.
"2825. 7 5 A guarantor is not exonerated by the discharge 'of
his principal by operation of law, without the intervention or
omission of the creditor."
It is believed that the conclusion is inescapable that these provisions,
in view of their nature, will be applied to sureties as well as guarantors.7 6
If, in order to have a "right," or a method of exoneration, a granting
of authority to take some kind of action is necessary, the only section
fulfilling the requirement is the following:
0SThe entire section (Field §1564; Mont. §8201; N.D. §6681; Okla. §5153; S.D.
§1504? reads as follows:
'A surety is exonerated-
"1. In like manner with a guarantor;
"2. To the extent to which he is prejudiced by any act of the creditor which
would naturally prove injurious to the remedies of the surety or inconsistent with
his rights, or which lessens his security; or,
"3. To the extent to which he is prejudiced by an omission of the creditor to
do anything, when required by the surety, which it is his duty to do."09Field §1544; Mont. §8181; N.D. §6661; Okla. §5133; S.D. §1484.70Field §1545; Mont. §8182; N.D. §6662; Okla. §5134; S.D. §1485.71Field §1548; Mont §8185; N.D. §6665; Okla. §5137; S.D. §1488.
72Field §1552; Mont. §8189; N.D. §6669; Okla. §5141; S.D. §1492.73Field §1555; Mont §8192; N.D. §6672; Okla. §5144; S.D. §1495.
74Field §1556; Mont. §8193; N.D. §6673; la. §5145; S.D. §1496.75Field §1557; Mont. §8194; N.D. §6674; Okla. § 5146; S.D. §1497.
76A complete list of the sections in the chapter on guaranties in general which
may be considered adverse to guarantors, in whole or in part, including those quoted
1937]
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
"2815.77 A continuing guaranty may be revoked at any time
by the guarantor, in respect to future transactions, unless there
is a continuing consideration as to such transactions which he does
not renounce."
This involves a result striking by its triviality. The conclusion seems clear,
as to all three possible uses, that the canon "'expressio unis" has small
place in the interpretation of the code provisions in this field.
IV. EFFECTS OF THE DISTINCTION
1. PAROL EVIDENCE
The following, in the chapter on Suretyship, is the only code provision
upon the subject of parol evidence:
"2832.8 One who appears to be a principal, whether by the
terms of a written instrument or otherwise, may show that he is
in fact a surety, except as against persons who have acted on
the faith of his apparent character of principal."
This provision is in accord with the previously mentioned judicial
assumption in all States, in the absence of special circumstances, that a
secondary party is a surety and not a guarantor.70 As pointed out, this
provision is in harmony with the purpose of the code to extend special
advantages to sureties, as compared with guarantors, and there is no ob-
jection to the use of expressio unis reasoning in connection with this par-
ticular section. 0
It may be concluded, therefore, that parol evidence may be used to
establish that an apparent principal is a surety, but not that he is a guar-
in the text, but omitting sections applying only to continuing guaranties or guaran-
ties of collection, is as follows:
Field Cal. Mont. N.D. Okla. S.D.
1535 2788 8172 6652 5124 1475
1536 2792 8173 6653 5125 1476
1537 2793 8174 6654 5126 1477
1538 2794 8175 6655 5127 1478
1539 2795 8176 6656 5128 1479
1544 2806 8181 6661 5133 1484
1545 2807 8182 6662 5134 1485
1546 2808 8183 6663 5135 1486
1548 2810 8185 6665 5137 1488
1552 2820 8189 6669 5141 1492
1554 2822 8191 6671 5143 1494
1555 2823 8192 6672 5144 1495
1556 2824 8193 6673 5145 1496
1557 2825 8194 6674 5146 1497
77Field §1550; Mont. §8187; N.D. §6667; Okla. §5139; S.D. §1490.
78Field §1559; Mont. §8196; N.D. §6676; Okla. §5148; S.D. §1499.
79Supra, at footnotes ##13, 22 & 23, under I. The Statement of the Dis-
tinction.
soSupra, at footnote #53, under III. The Role of Fxpressio Unis.
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antor.81 Complications would arise, along the lines of previous discussion, 2
if the evidence should disclose either that the alleged surety had received
compensation, or that he had assumed liability at the request of the creditor.
2. STATUTE OF FRAUDS
In view of the many text and judicial statements to the effect that sure-
tyship obligations are original and primary, while guaranties are collateral
and secondary, it would seem natural to expect that difference to be dis-
closed in connection with the Statute of Frauds. However, such statements
never have been sound on principle, and it seems to be universally true
that the same tests are applied to both classes of obligations in order to de-
termine when they are required to be in writing.83  All the code provisions
of this character8" appear in the chapter entitled "Guaranty in General." 85
3. KNOWLEDGE OR CONSENT OF PRINCIPAL
In the chapter on "Guaranty in General"8 there is the following
section:
"2788.87 A person may become guarantor even without the
knowledge or consent of the principal."
A suretyship obligation must be assumed at the request of the principal ;17A
but this difference produces no effects in the application of the distinction.
4. SEPARATE CONSIDERATION
It has often been said, in distinguishing sureties from guarantors, that
the former are bound at the same time as the principal, by the same instru-
81lllustrations of cases considering parol evidence of this sort, and either hold-
ing or assuming that if the evidence is admitted and sufficient the secondary party
will be proved to be a surety, are: Harlan v. Ely, 56 Cal. 340 (1880); Farmers'
Natl. Gold Bank v. Stover, 60 Cal. 387 (1882) ; Casey v. Gibbons, 136 Cal. 368, 68
Pac. 1032 (1902) ; Farmers etc., Bank v. De Shorb, 137 Cal. 685, 70 Pac. 771 (1902) ;
McCarthy v. Madison, 190 Cal. 243, 212 Pac. 7 (1922); Granger v. Harper, 217 Cal.
16, 17 Pac.(2d) 135 (1932); Osborn v. Hamilton, 16 Cal.App. 634, 117 Pac. 786(1911) ; First Natl. Bank of Escondido v. Williams, 54 Cal.App. 537, 202 Pac. 164
(1921); Stovall v. Adair, 9 Okla. 620, 60 Pac. 282 (1900).
No attempt to use parol evidence to establish that the secondary party was a
guarantor has been found, nor any discussion of such possibility.82See: I. The Statement of the Distinction, supra.
83Of course, in a particular case, the presence or absence of consideration may
be relevant both from the standpoint of the Statute of Frauds and in distinguishing
between suretyship and guaranty.
Early in his work, Arant states that suretyship contracts are not within the
Statute of Frauds. Arant on Suretyship (1931), 24, §16. This seems to be a slip,
as later the statement apparently is corrected, or at least overlooked. Ibid. 84, §§30
et seq. Cf. Stearns on Suretyship (Feinsinger's 4th ed. 1934), 41, §35.
84§§2793 & 2794 (Field §§1537 & 1538; Mont. §§8174 & 8175; N.D. §§6654 &
6655; Okla. §§5126 & 5127; S.D. §§1477 & 1478). There are, of course, apart from
the portion of the code dealing with suretyship and guaranty, general provisions
along the lines of the original Statute of Frauds.
SuAs to titles in States other than California, see footnote #18, supra.
It is assumed that expressio unis reasoning will not be used here.8GAs to titles in States other than California, see footnote #18, supra.87Field §1535; Mont. §8172; N.D. §6652; Okla. §5124; S.D. §1475.
87ADiscussed in text at footnote #24, supra.
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ment, and with the same consideration However, it is believed that, in
dealing with contemporaneous assumptions of liability purporting to be guar-
anties, the courts never have failed to find, when necessary in order to uphold
the same, that entering into the contract with the principal is sufficient con-
sideration to support the undertaking of the guarantor, thus, in effect,
eliminating the requirement of separate consideration. Assuming that ex-
pressio unis reasoning is not to be used to reach absurd results, the following
section in the chapter on "Guaranty in General"88 creates no distinction
between the two classes of obligations:
"2792.89 Where a guaranty is entered into at the same time
with the original obligation, or with the acceptance of the latter by
the guarantee, and forms with that obligation a part of the con-
sideration to him, no other consideration need exist. In all other
cases there must be a consideration distinct from that of the
original obligation."
5. STATEMENT OF CONSIDERATION
Presumably the rule set 'forth in the following section, in the chapter on
"Guaranty in General",90 applies to sureties as well as guarantors :91
"2793.92 . . A guaranty . . . need not express a
consideration."
6. CONSTRUCTION
The following provisions 93 in the chapter on "Guaranty in General"9 4
relate to construction. It may be assumed that they are not to be limited
to guarantors who are not sureties.
"2799.91 In a guaranty of a contract, the terms of which are
not then settled, it is implied that its terms shall be such as will not
expose the guarantor to greater risks than he would incur under
those terms which are most common in similiar contracts at the
place where the principal contract is to be performed."
"2806.96 A guaranty is to be deemed unconditional unless its
terms import some condition precedent to the liability of the guar-
antor."
"2808.97 Where one guarantees a conditional obligation, his
liability is commensurate with that of the principal, unless he is
88As to titles in States other than California, see footnote #18, s.upra.89Field §1536; Mont. §8173; N.D. §6653; Okla. §5125; S.D. §1476.90As to titles in States other than California, see footnote #18, supra.911t is assumed that no unreasonable application of expressia unis reasoning
will be made. See discussion under Ill. The Role of Expressio Unis, at footnotes
##51 & 52, spra.92Field §1537; Mont. §8174; N.D. §6654; Okla. §5126; S.D. §1477.
93§2800 (Field §1541; Mont. §8178; N.D. §6658; Okla. §5130; S.D. §1481), re-
lating only to guaranties of collection, is not set forth.
%4As to titles in States other than California, see footnote #18, supra.95Field §1540; Mont. §8177; N.D. §6657; Okla. §5129; S.D. §1480.96Field §1544; Mont. §8181; N.D. §6661; Okla. §5133; S.D. §1484.97Field §1546; Mont §8183; N.D. §6663; Okla. §5135; S.D. §1486.
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unable, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, to acquire informa-
tion of such default, and the creditor has actual notice thereof.
"2809.98 The obligation of a guarantor must be neither larger
in amount nor in other respects more burdensome than that of the
principal; and if in its terms it exceeds it, it is reducible in propor-
tion to the principal obligation."
The following provision, in the chapter on suretyship, if interpreted to
exclude as to sureties the introduction of any implied terms, would bring
about absurd results.
"2836. 99 A surety cannot be held beyond the express terms
of his contract, and if such contract prescribes a penalty for its
breach, he cannot in any case be liable for more than the penalty."
The next section provides:
"2837.100 In interpreting the terms of a contract of surety-
ship, the same rules are to be observed as in the case of other con-
tracts."
The latter provision is relatively general, and under usual canons of con-
struction would yield to the more specific prohibition in the preceding sec-
tion. In a widely quoted passage, the Supreme Court of California has,
however, indicated an intention to make reasonable implications in inter-
preting suretyship contracts. Section 2836 seems to be thought of as merely
a mild retention of strictissimi juris. Mr. Justice Lorigan said, in the
leading Sather case:
"While it is true that a surety cannot be held beyond the express
terms of his contract, yet in interpreting the terms of a contract of
suretyship, the same rules are to be observed as in the case of
other contracts. Such construction does not mean that words are to
be distorted out of their natural meaning, or that, by implication,
something can be read into the contract that it will not reasonably-
bear; but it means that the contract will be fairly construed with a
view to effect the object for which it was given, and to accomplish
the purpose for which it was designed. The old rule of strictissimi
juris applies only to the extent, that no implication shall be in-
dulged in to impose a burden not clearly inferable from the lan-
guage of the contract, but does not apply so as to hold that the
contract shall not be reasonably interpreted as other contracts are.
(Civ. Code, sec. 2837 .))"101
Mr. Commissioner Thacker, of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, said,
on the other hand:
"In interpreting the terms of a contract of suretyship, the same
rules will be observed as in the case of other contracts [citing
98Field §1547; Mont. §8184; N.D. §6664; Okla. §5136; S.D. §1487.99Field §1560; Mont. §8197; N.D. §6677; Okla. §5149; S.D. §1500.
10OField §1561; Mont. §8198; N.D. §6678; Okla. §5150; S.D. §1501.10 1Sather Banking Co. v. Briggs Co., 138 Cal. 724, 730, 72 Pac. 352, 354 (1903).
The statements quoted must be regarded as dicta, as the facts do not disclose any
necessity for implying terms.
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§2837]; but, after being so interpreted, and the intelligible mean-
ing of its language is ascertained, the same will be construed and
applied strictly, in favor of the surety, and so as to not allow any
implication against him [citing cases]. ' '102
Nothwithstanding the dictum of the learned commissioner, possibly
influenced to some extent by Section 2836, supra, it seems safe to conclude
that none of the code provisions quoted will cause any departure from usual
modes of interpretation in dealing with either suretyship or guaranty con-
tracts, and that the distinction between them is without significance in this
connection.103
7. DATE OF MATURITY
The following provision appears only in the chapter on "Guaranty in
General" :104
"2807. L 5 A guarantor of payment or performance is liable to
the guarantee immediately upon the default of the principal, and
without demand or notice."
A South Dakota decision' 0 6 refused to apply this section to sureties
upon an official bond.' 0 7 In general a contrary result would seem to be
required.
8. COMPENSATED SECONDARY PARTIES
Under the code provisions, whether secondary parties are gratuitous or
compensated is relevant only in drawing the suretyship-guaranty distinction,
10 2 Dolese Bros. Co. v. Chaney & Rickard, 44 Okla. 745, 749, 145 Pac. 1119, 1120(1914). Upon the facts implication of terms was not necessary.
Both before and after the Sather case, just quoted in the text, supra, Mr. Com-
.missioner Cooper, of the Supreme Court of California, dropped remarks to the effect
that implications against sureties would not be permitted: Boas v. Maloney, 138 Cal.
105, 107, 70 Pac. 1004, 1005 (1902) ; County of Glenn v. Jones, 146 Cal. 518 520 80
Pac. 695, 696 (1905), but the strict decision in the Boas case, the only one in wiich
the repudiation of implications could have been relevant on the facts, was later
expressly disapproved by the Supreme Court of California in denying a petition for
hearing. Callan v. Empire State Surety Co., 20 Cal.App. 483, 491, 129 Pac. 978,
981 (1912).
It was held that the by-laws of a corporation could be held to constitute part
of a bond of its secretary referring to them. Humboldt Savings & Loan Soc. v.
Wennerhold, 81 Cal. 528, 532, 22 Pac. 920, 922 (1889). An ultra-strict limitation to
express terms would prevent even this, although normally the by-laws would be
considered incorporated by reference. The opinion carefully discusses the code
provisions.1 03 1t seems reasonable to expect that, insofar as the canon of construction
against the one preparing the instrument is used, it will be applied more often
against sureties than against guarantors.
104 As to titles in States other than California, see footnote #18, stipra.
10 5 Field §1545; Mont. §8182; N.D. §6662; Okla. §5134; S.D. §1485.
10 6Clark County v. Howard, 58 S.D. 457, 459, 237 N.W. 561, 562 (1931).
1071t was held that interest ran against the sureties upon a county treasurer s
bond only from date of demand by the obligee, based upon defalcations, rather than
from the dates of the various wrongful acts. Without citing any statute specially
relating to official bonds, Mr. Commissioner Miser said: "In this case we are not
attempting to determine when sureties on all manner of bonds should become liable
for interest. We are dealing only with the case of a surety on an official bond
where the principal has embezzled money, of which many acts of embezzlement
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and not in connection with its effects. As has been pointed out at length,108
the code definition of a surety seems to constitute all compensated secondary
parties guarantors.
9. NOTICE OF ACCEPTANCE
In the chapter on "Guaranty in general," 0 9 it is provided:
"2795.110 A mere offer to guaranty is not binding, until
notice of its acceptance is communicated by the guarantee to the
guarantor; but an absolute guaranty is binding upon the guarantor
without notice of acceptance."
While there is no corresponding provision in the chapter on surety-
ship, the requirement of notice would seem equally applicable ih behalf of
sureties. Apart from the impropriety of applying the expressio unis canon
in this connection in any event,"' the right to insist upon notice would
seem to be within the scope of the rights and methods of exoneration of
guarantors extended to sureties." 2 A South Dakota decision was, how-
ever, put upon the ground that the relation contemplated in connection with
an offer was one of suretyship and, therefore, that notice of acceptance was
not necessary." 3
10. DEFENSES OF PRINCIPAL
The following sections in the chapter on "Guaranty in general""14 relate
to the effect of defenses which the principal may have at the time the obli-
gation is entered into:
neither the surety nor the obligee were aware until several years thereafter." The
learned commissioner referred to the code definitions of suretyship and guaranty,
but held that the terms are defined by the entire chapters of which they form parts.
It is true that the South Dakota code departs from Field's organization of the
materials. There is no general title covering both suretyship and guaranty, and the
first chapter is entitled "Guaranty," instead of "Guaranty in General.' However, the
code definitions have been left untouched, so that suretyship obligations also satisfy
the more general requirement of the definition of guaranty. A North Dakota deci-
sion, Dickinson v. White, 25 N.D. 523, 143 N.W. 754, 49 L.R.A.[N.S.] 362 (1913), is
quoted, in which a similar holding was made without referring to the code pro-
visions.
Consult III. The Role of Expressio Unis, in the text, at footnotes ##51 &
52, supra.
08 See I. The Statement of the Distinction, at footnotes ##27-33, supra.
'09As to titles in States other than California, see footnote #18, supra.
'1°Field §1539; Mont. §8176; N.D. §6656; Okla. §5128; S.D. §1479.
"'1See III. The Role of Expressio Unis, at footnotes ##51 & 52, supra.
1 1 2Under §§2840 (1) & 2844 (Field §§1564 [1] & 1565; Mont. §§ 8201 [1] &
8202; N.D. §§6681 [1] & 6682; Okla. §§5153 [1] & 5154; S.D. §§1504 [1] & 1505).
"13 Dennis v. Great Northern Const. Co., 53 S.D. 652, 222 N.W. 269, 270 (1928).
The court pointed out that it probably could have disposed of the case upon the
ground that, in any event, the writing signed would constitute an absolute guaranty,
and not a mere offer.
In Aluminum Cooking Utensil Co. v. Rohe, 43 N.D. 433, 435, 175 N.W. 620, 621
(1919), it was held that a letter of credit constituted a contract of guaranty, and
not suretyship, and, therefore, that it was necessary to plead notice of acceptance.
1 14 As to titles in States other than California, see footnote #18, supra.
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"2809.115 The obligation of a guarantor must be neither
larger in amount nor in other respects more burdensome than that
of the principal; and if in its terms it exceeds it, it is reducible in
proportion to the principal obligation.
"2810.116 A guarantor is not liable if the contract of the
principal is unlawful ;117 but he is liable notwithstanding any mere
personal disability of the principal, though the disability be such as
to make the contract void against the principal."
It seems clear that these provisions are applicable to sureties. The
reasoning set forth in the preceding sub-section is apropos here.
11. ALTERATIONS
The sections, in each of the chapters, dealing with alterations,"" are
in harmony with the state of the law throughout the country, and create
no differences between suretyships and guaranties.
In California and Montana, however, a difference seems to exist apart
from the Field Code provisions. In these States, for reasons which will be
pointed out later,"19 in situations in which there are several secondary
parties, if certain forms of security are taken, either from the principal or
from another secondary party, subsequent to the execution of the obligation,
there are two consequences which result as to sureties which do not occur
in the case of guarantors :120
(1) One surety can not sue another without previously or simulta-
neously taking advantage of the security; and
(2) Where there previously has been no other security from any party,
the theretofore existing remedy of attachment' 2' against a suretyl 2la
not putting up security is lost.
11 5Field §1547; Mont. §8184; N.D. §6664; Okla. §5136; S.D. §1487.
"16Field §1548; Mont. §8185; N.D. §6665; Okla. §5137; S.D. §1488.
117If an extreme application of expressio unis reasoning were to be made here,
it could be urged that the reference to unlawful contracts excludes the guarantor
from taking advantage of other causes of invalidity of the principal's contract-for
example, that it was secured through duress. Such a possibility has received nojudicial consideration, and the code provision should not be given any such effect in
this connection.
'
18Field Cal. Mont. N.D. Okla. S.D.
1551 2819 8188 6668 5140 1491
1552 2820 8189 6669 5141 1492
1553 2821 8190 6670 5142 1493
1556 2824 8193 6673 5145 1496
1564(2) 2840(2) 8201(2) 6681(2) 5153(2) 1504(2)
The extension to sureties of the methods of exoneration and rights of guar-
antors is important here. §§2840 (1) & 2844 (Field §§1564 [] & 1565; Mont. §§8201[1] & 8202; N.D. §§6681 [1] & 6682; Okla. §§5153 [1] & 5154; S.D. §§1504 [1] &1505).) 9 See subsections 18 and 19, at footnotes ##144 & 152, infra.
120It is assumed that the facts are such that the various guarantors can be
regarded, as among themselves, as liable upon separate contracts.
121As to suits by one guarantor against another, after the putting up of security
by a guarantor, it is assumed that they are liable upon separate contracts of guaranty.121aIt is assumed that the facts are such in other respects as to make the remedy
of attachment available.
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It is possible, therefore, under these conditions, for sureties to claim (though
guarantors can not) that their remedies have been impaired through the
taking of such additional security; and, therefore, that they have been dis-
charged from liability. The doctrine of implied consent on the part of a
surety or guarantor to certain alterations, 122 if held applicable, as it should
be, would avoid this result; but anyone familiar with this field can have no
sense of assurance in this regard. 2 3
12. RELEASE OF SECURITY
While the only reference to subrogation of the secondary party to the
rights of the creditor as to security appears in the chapter on suretyship,
12
it is not conceivable that familiar principles in this regard would not be
applied to guarantors12 5
13. NOTICE OF DEFAULT
It is provided in the chapter on "Guaranty in general,"'1 26 that a guarantor
of payment or performance is liable immediately upon default, without de-
mand or notice.12 7  It would seem clear that this should be held applicable
to sureties,'2 8 and it has been so held in California, the court saying, per
cuttarn:
"Cases often occur in which it is difficult to determine whether a
given contract is one of surety or of guaranty, and it is believed the
object of the code was to place the contract of guaranty on the
same plane with that of surety by dispensing with the necessity
of demand and notice in the former, as the courts in a majority
of instances have is [sic] the latter. Coburn v. Brooks, 78 Cal.
443, and Chafoin v. Rich, 77 Cal. 476, have settled the doctrine in
this state that no demand or notice is necessary to fix the liability
of a surety, except in cases where such demand and notice are ex-
pressly required by the language of the contract.'
'1 29
122Fruit Growers Supply Co. v. Goss, 4 Cal.App.(2d) 651, 655, 41 Pac.(2d) 357,
359 (1935), hear. den. Sup. Ct.12 3 1n Granger v. Harper, 68 Cal.App.Dec. 704, 8 Pac.(2d) 204 (1932), revd. on
another ground, 217 Cal. 16, 17 Pac.(2d) 135 (1932), it was held that a surety was
discharged when security was taken later from the principal. In cases where there
is only a single secondary party, there would seem to be no distinction possible be-
tween a surety and a guarantor, as to impairment of remedies, in connection with
the taking of security from the principal. In either case the situation upon subro-
gation to the creditor's position is the same.
124§2849 (Field §1570; Mont. §8207; N.D. §6687; Okla. §5159; S.D. §1510). As
to titles in States other than California, see footnote #18, supra. §§2819 & 2840(2)(Field §§1551 & 1564 [2]; Mont. §§8188 & 8201 [2]; N.D. §§6668 & 6681 [2]; Okla.
§§5140 & 5153 [2] ; S.D. §§1491 & 1504 [21) could be interpreted to include this
matter in their general provisions.125See II. The Role of Expressio Unis, at footnote #65, sup-a.
12GAs to titles in States other than California, see footnote #18, supra.
127§2807 (Field §1545; Mont. §8182; N.D. §6662; Okla. §5134; S.D. §1485). In
the following section there is a special provision with regard to conditional obliga-
tions.
128See III. The Role of Expressio Unis, at footnotes ##51 & 52, supra.129Treweek v. Howard, 105 Cal. 434, 441, 39 Pac. 20, 22 (1895). A dictum to
the same effect appears in Carpenter v. Furrey, 128 Cal. 665, 668, 61 Pac. 369, 370
(1900).
Professor Radin, speaking of the situation throughout the country generally,
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14. REQUEST TO PROCEED AGAINST PRINCIPAL
The doctrine of Pain v. Packard,130 which is somewhat broader than
the above title, is codified as follows in the chapter on suretyship:
"2845.181 A surety may require his creditor to proceed
against the principal, or to pursue any other remedy in his power
which the surety cannot himself pursue, and which would lighten
his burden; and if in such case the creditor neglects to do so, the
surety is exonerated to the extent to which he is thereby
prejudiced."
It does not apply to guarantors.18 2
15. PERFORMANCE AND TENDER
In the chapter on suretyship it is provided:
"2839.1's Performance of the principal obligation, or an offer
says: "The reason for trying to distinguish between a surety and a guarantor is
generally to determine whether or not the intercessor is entitled to notice or whether
the principal must be sued first. But that, as a matter of fact, is determined, as it
should be, by conclusions about the intentions of the parties in the matter, based in
most cases on such knowledge of mercantile custom as the court possesses." Radin,
Guaranty and Suretyship, 18 CAL.L.REv. 21, 29 (1929).18013 Johns. 174, 7 Am.Dec. 369 (N.Y. 1816).
131§2845 (Field §1566; Mont. §8203; N.D. §6683; Okda. §5155; S.D. §1506).
See also §2840(3) (Field §1564 [3] ; Mont. §8201 [3]; N.D. §6681 [3] ; Okla. §5153
[3] ; S.D. §1504 [3]).
132 Grace v. Croninger, 56 Cal.App. 659, 667, 206 Pac. 130, 134 (1922). Although
it is not entirely clear that the court is referring to a principle of law, as distin-
guished from insufficiency of the facts, there is apparently a holding to the same
effect in First Natl. Bank v. Babcock, 94 Cal. 96, 104, 29 Pac. 415, 416, 28 Am,St.
Rep. 94, 98 (1892). See also Mahana v. Alexander, 88 Cal.App. 111, 116, 263 Pac.
260, 262 (1927). See III. The Role of Expressio Unis, at footnote #64, supra.
In a South Dakota case, the court found that the parties were sureties, although
the word -"guaranty" was used in their contract, and, therefore, that they were
entitled to make the request. Bailey Loan Co. v. Seward, 9 S.D. 326, 332, 69 N.W.
58, 60 (1896).
In an Oklahoma case, the court apparently misconceived the nature of the
Pain v. Packard doctrine, and apparently misinterpreted the code section embodying
it, in a holding that that section is controlled by a later section (Field §1569; Cal.§2848; Mont. §8206; N.D. §6686; Okla. §5158; S.D. §1509), relating to subrogation
of the surety to the creditor's position upon satisfaction of the obligation. Palmer
v. Noe, 48 Okla. 450, 458, 150 Pac. 462, 464 (1915). Under such a holding, theformer section is left without effect, unless it can be conceived that, after discharge
of the obligation by the surety, there may be remedies still available to the creditor
to which the surety could not be subrogated.
In another Oklahoma case it was held that, insofar as suing the principal is
concerned, the Pain v. Packard code section is controlled by another relating gen-
erally to joinder of parties in suits where a number of persons are severally liable
upon the same obligation. National Bank of Poteau v. Lowrey, 57 Okla. 304, 308,
157 Pac. 103, 104 (1916).
The Pain v. Packard doctrine was, however, applied as one ground of the de-
cision in Hollis v. Parks, 92 Okla. 291, 219 Pac. 110 (1923). The doctrine is set
forth by way of dictum in Gregg v. Oklahoma State Bank, 72 Okla. 193, 195, 179
Pac. 613, 615 (1919), although the court also quoted an opinion criticizing the
doctrine. In Union Mutual Insurance Co. v. Page, 65 Okla. 101, 164 Pnc. 116,
L.R.A. 1918C 1 (1917), it was held that a "simple request" is not sufficient to gain
for the surety the benefit of the Pain v. Packard doctrine. Miller v. State ex rel.
Lankford, 52 Okla. 76, 152 Pac. 409 (1915), reaffirms Palmer v. Noe, supra, this
note. The authors are indebted to Professor Maurice H. Merrill for assistance
in connection with the Oklahoma cases.
188 Field §1563; Mont. §8200; N.D. §6680; Okla. §5152; S.D. §1503.
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of such performance, duly made as provided in this code, exon-
erates a surety."
Notwithstanding the expressio unis inference to be drawn from the express
statement of a provision only as to sureties, 134 it seems safe to conclude that
a court would find some ground upon which to apply the same rule to
guarantors. If this were not done, the result would be even more absurd
as to performance than as to tender, for the chapter on "Guaranty in Gen-
eral"'135 provides for partial discharge through part performance,136 but con-
tains no reference to full performance.
16. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS
Under the Field Code no consequences from the distinction between
suretyship and guaranty can be observed, either as to the time when the
period of limitation begins to run in favor of the secondary party against
the creditor, 37 or as to the effect upon the liability of the secondary party
of the barring by the statute of the creditor's claim against the principal. 18
17. JOINDER WITH PRINCIPAL
In the history of the distinction between suretyship and guaranty
throughout the country it often has been said that the surety is bound by
the same contract as the principal, and the guarantor by a separate con-
tract.13 9 This has led to holdings that the guarantor can not be sued with
the principal, and that the surety must be. The point is not touched upon
13 4See III. The Role of Expressio Unis, at footnote #65, supra.
135As to titles in States other than California, see footnote #18, supra.
136§2822 (Field §1554; Mont. §8191; N.D. §6671; Okla. §5143; S.D. §1494).
137§2807 (Field §1545; Mont. §8182; N.D. §6662; Okla. §5134; S.D. §1485), in
the chapter on "Guaranty in General" (as to titles in States other than California, see
footnote #18, supra), provides: "A guarantor of payment or performance is liable
to the guarantee immediately upon the default of the principal, and without demand
or notice."
As pointed out under III. 7. Date of Maturity, at footnote #106, supra, a
South Dakota decision, Clark County v. Howard, 58 S.D. 457, 459, 237 N.W. 561,
562 (1931), held that interest did not commence to run against the sureties upon an
official bond until demand upon them by the creditor. The reasoning of the court
in that case would, in like manner, lead to a holding that the statute of limitations
does not begin to run in favor of the sureties upon such a bond until demand.
'38§2825 (Field §1557; Mont. §8194; N.D. §6674; Okla. §5146; S.D. §1497), in
the chapter on "Guaranty in General" (as to titles in States other than California, see
footnote #18, supra), reads: "A guarantor is not exonerated by the discharge of
his principal by operation of law, without the intervention or omission of the cred-
itor." While it would not seem to be doubtful whether it should not be considered
that the running of the period of limitation involves an omission upon the part of
the creditor, in Gaffigan v. Lawton, 1 Cal.(2d) 722, 37 Pac.(2d) 79 (1934), this
section was applied to the obligation of a surety in this connection, coupled with§2840(1) (Field §1564 [1]; Mont. §8201 [1]; N.D. §6681 [1]; Okla. §5153 [1]; S.D.
§1504[l] in the chapter on Suretyship (as to titles in States other than California,
see footnote #18, supra), providing that a surety is exonerated "in like manner with
a guarantor."
'
39 In Emerson-Brantingham Imp. Co. v. Raugstad, 65 Mont. 297, 303, 211 Pac.
305, 307 (1922), Mr. Justice Galen said: "A contract of guaranty is distinguishable
from one of surety, in that the former is an independent contract, whereby the
promisor is bound independently of the person for whose benefit it is made, while
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in the code sections on suretyship and guaranty, but in Field's Code of Civil
Procedure it was provided:
"Persons severally liable upon the same obligation or instrument,
including the parties to bills of exchange and promissory notes,
may, all or any of them, be included in the same action, at the
option of the plaintiff. '140
This provision is now in force, in amplified form, in each of the five States
under consideration, 141 and would seem clearly to cover both sureties and
guarantors. 1 42 It has, however, been held in Montana, without referring to
this section, that the distinction persists in this connection, Mr. Justice Stark
saying:
"A creditor may bring an action jointly against a surety and the
debtor, but he cannot join both the guarantor and the debtor in
one suit, because there is neither privity of contract, mutuality, nor
joint liability between the principal debtor and his guarantor." 148
18. PROCEEDING FIRST AGAINST SECURITY TO CREDITOR FROM OTHER
PARTIES
In the chapter on suretyship it is provided:
"2850.'14 Whenever property of a surety is hypothecated
with property of the principal, the surety is entitled to have the
property of the principal first applied to the discharge of the obli-
gation."
It may be assumed that expressio unis reasoning 48 will not be used to ex-
the latter is a contract whereby the promisor is bound jointly with the principal on
the same contract."
In Square Butte State Bank v. Ballard, 64 Mont. 554, 560, 210 Pac. 889, 890(1922), Mr. Justice Cooper said: "A guarantor's agreement is to pay if the principal
does not or cannot. He does not join in the contract, but in an independent under-
takinr promises that the principal will perform his agreement, and if he does not
then he (the guarantor) will do it for him."
In Adams v. Wallace, 119 Cal. 67, 71, 51 Pac. 14, 15 (1897), Mr. Justice Hen-
shaw said: "There is no privity or mutuality or joint liability between the principal
debtor and his guarantor."
140 Code of Procedure of Pleadings and Practice of the State of New York(April 11, 1849), §120. This was §100 of the original code of the same title, April
12, 1848, in which it was derived from the N.Y.Laws (1832), c. 276. The authors
are indebted to Mr. Miles 0. Price, Law Librarian of Columbia University, for this
information.
141Cal.Code Civ.Proc. (1935), §383; Mont.Rev.Code (1935), §9084; N.D.Comp.
Laws (1913), §7407; Okla.Comp.Stats.Ann. (1921), §222 (indorsers and guarantors
added); S.D.Comp.Laws (1929), §2316.142 T he section was applied to joinder of guarantor and principal in Rice
Securities Co. v. Daggs, 63 Cal.App. 273, 218 Pac. 484 (1923); and see Mahana v.
Alexander, 88 Cal.App. 111, 116, 263 Pac. 260, 262 (1927); but see Loustalot v.
Calkins, 120 Cal. 688, 690, 53 Pac. 258, 259 (1898). Titlus v. Woods, 45 Cal.App.
541, 546, 218 Pac. 68, 70 (1920), brings in Cal.Code Civ.Proc. (1935), §726 (Mont.
Rev.Code [1935], §9467).
'
43Butte Machinery Co. v. Carbonate Hill Mining Co., 75 Mont. 167, 170, 242
Pac. 956, 957 (1926). In Cole Mfg. Co. v. Morton, 24 Mont. 61, 60 Pac. 587 (1900),
it was held that the secondary parties were sureties, and, therefore, could be joined
with the principal.
14 4Field §1571; Mont. §8208; N.D. §6688; Okla. §5160; S.D. §1511.
14 5See III. The Role of Expressio Unis, at footnote #65, supra.
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dude application of this familiar principle to cases involving guaranties.1 46
A special problem arises in California and Montana, apart from the
Field Code provisions. The "but one action" rule provides that where an
obligation is secured by mortgage or deed of trust there can be but one
action brought, which must include proceedings against the property, unless
the property previously has been subjected to the debt through private
sale.1 47 A distinction arises here between sureties and guarantors, in cases
where property is put up by the principal alone.148 The difference is due
to the erroneous conception that the surety is a party to the same contract
as the principal, whereas the guarantor is liable upon a separate contract.
As the surety is a party to the contract secured by the property put up by
the principal, he can not be proceeded against without making use of the
mortgage or deed of trust. 49 In the case of the guarantor, his separate
14aBut see careless citations of this section in Adams v. Wallace, 119 Cal. 67,
70, 51 Pac. 14, 15 (1897), and Kelley v. Goldschmidt, 47 Cal.App. 38, 42, 190 Pac. 55,
57 (1920).147Until 1933 the rule was set forth only in Cal.Code Civ.Proc. (1935), §726(Mont.Rev.Code [1935], §9467). While this section in terms refers only to mort-
gages, in the leading case of Bank of Italy Natl. Trust & Say. Assn. v. Bentley, 217
Cal. 644, 658, 20 Pac.(2d) 940, 945 (1933), it was held that "either by reason of
implied agreement or by reason of public policy" the same rule applied to deeds of
trust. In 1933, Cal.Code Civ.Proc. §580a was enacted, expressly creating such a
requirement as to trust deeds. The Montana statute refers only to mortgages.
148If a secondary party who is sued has given a mortgage or deed of trust,
there would seem to be no doubt that the "but one action" rule should be applied.
140Birkhofer v. Krumm, 4 Cal.App. (2d) 43, 50, 40 Pac. (2d) 553, 557 (1935).
In this case the grantee of land had assumed payment of a deed of trust, referred
to by the court for convenience as a mortgage, given by the grantor. It was held,
Mr. Justice Marks delivering the opinion, that "from the point of view of the mort-
gagee both the grantor and the grantee stand in the relation of sureties for the pay-
ment of the deficiency to the mortgagee." The reasoning that the grantee is only a
surety seems open to criticism, but is not relevant for purposes of the present
inquiry. The opinion continued: "A surety may require his creditor to exhaust the
principal fund to lighten the surety's burden before proceeding against the surety
personally. (Sec. 2845, Civ. Code; Murphy v. Hellman etc. Bank, 43 Cal. App. 579,
185 Pac. 485.) This reasoning brings us to a point where the rules we have an-
nounced governing the relations of the mortgagor, his grantee and the mortgagee
are in strict harmony with the provisions of section 726 of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure and the multitude of decisions which hold that the mortgagee must exhaust
the security before he can recover against his debtor and that this recovery must be
limited to the deficiency remaining after applying the funds derived from the sale
of the property on the debt." No action having been taken in regard to the land,
it was held that the grantee could not be sued personally and his other property
attached. There had been no request by the grantee to the creditor to take proceed-
ings, so that the reference to the Pain v. Packard doctrine and §2845 setting it forth
is only dictum.
In Adams v. Wallace, 119 Cal. 67, 70, 51 Pac. 14, 15 (1897), in which the de-
fendant secondary party was held to be a guarantor, Mr. Justice Henshaw said:
"Were she a mere surety, as distinguished from a guarantor, she would have the
unquestioned right to demand that plaintiff should first apply to the discharge of
the debt the property of the principal, Pierce, which had been mortgaged. (Civ.
Code, secs. 2849, 2850.) Upon the other hand, if she be a guarantor for the payment
of the debt upon default, then it would matter not whether there were other security
for the payment of that debt; the principal creditor would have the right to prose-
cute his action against the guarantor, without proceeding to realize upon other
securities or without going into equity to foreclose his mortgage. (London etc. Bank
v. Smith, 101 Cal. 415; Brandt on Suretyship and Guaranty, 97; Baylies on Sureties
and Guarantors, 189, 303, 304, 305.) . . .
'The contention that the action cannot be maintained at all, as being violative
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of the provisions of 776 [726] of the Code of Civil Procedure, is not well taken.
This is not an action for the collection of the Pierce [principal] debt as such, even
if it be conceded that this debt was secured by mortgage. It is an action upon an
independent contract of the defendant, with which Pierce had nothing to do, and
which might have been entered into by the parties to it without his knowledge or
against his wishes. There is no privity, or mutuality, or joint liability between the
principal debtor and his guarantor. (Bull v. Coe, 77 Cal. 54; 11 Am.St.Rep. 235;
Baylies on Sureties and Guarantors, 4; Cole v. Watertown Merchants' Bank, 60 Ind.
350.)" It is believed that the learned justice was in error in citing in this connection
§§2849 & 2850, the latter quoted in the text, supra. §2849 relates to subrogation of
the surety upon payment; §2850 refers only to situations in which both the principal
and the surety have hypothecated property.
In Kelley v. Goldschmidt, 47 Cal.App. 38, 42, 190 Pac. 55, 57 (1920), Mr.justice Hart, in deciding that, although the principal had given a deed of trust
attachment could still be had in an action against guarantors as upon an unsecured
obligation, said: "A mortgage or a trust deed given to secure the performance of
an obligation to pay money and a guaranty given for the same purpose are each in-
tended, of course, to subserve the same purpose, and where both are given to secure
one single obligation of that character, the one operates merely as additional security
to the other. But the creditor may resort either to the one or the other to enforce
the payment of the money to secure the payment of which both were given. In case
of a contract of surety executed to secure the performance of the obligation which
is also secured by a mortgage or other collateral security the law is different. In the
latter case, the holder of the mortgage or other security would be compelled to
apply to the payment of the debt the property of the debtor which had been mort-
gaged to secure the debt. (Civ. Code, sec. 2850; Adams v. Wallace, mipra.) Such,
however, is not the case as to a guarantor, as we have shown."
Professor Radin, without citation of authorities, says: ". . . If the obliga-
tion is secured both by a mortgage and by personal securities, the surety cannot be
sued without foreclosing the mortgage, but the guarantor can." Radin, Guaranty
and Suretyship, 18 CAI.L.REv. 21, 29 (1929).
But see Murphy v. Hellman Commercial, etc., Bank, 43 Cal.App. 579, 586, 185
Pac. 485, 488 (1919), cited in the quotation from the Birkhofer case, in this note
supra, in which Mr. Justice Nourse said: ". . . The rule in this state as to
section 726 clearly is that this section applies to the primary debtor and was enacted
for his benefit; that it does not apply to an individual guarantor or surety, or to a
subsequent indorser upon a promissory note, nor in fact to any case where there is
no privity of contract existing between the two obligations-that is, where the pri-
mary debt and the obligation under the mortgage are separate and distinct obliga-
tions." It is not believed that, on the facts of the case, the decision is in conflict
with the statement in the text. The defendants, without assuming personal liability,
had placed a deed absolute in escrow to secure the obligation of another as prin-
cipal debtor. It was not decided whether the defendants acted as sureties or as
guarantors. The principal had not given any security other than property purchased
which had given rise to the obligation, and this property had been returned by him
to the creditor before the creditor had brought an action against anyone. Thus,
apart from the property put up by the defendants, the obligation had ceased to be
secured before the creditor commenced his first action. The first suit instituted by
the creditor was against the principal alone, and judgment in it was secured against
the principal before the present action was commenced. When the suit under con-
sideration was brought, to subject the land covered by the deed to the balance
of the indebtedness, it was properly held, there having been no previous action
against the owners or their property, that they could not avail themselves of the
"but one action" rule. The "but one action" rule should not be interpreted to set
up any requirement of joinder of parties or causes of action, any farther than is
necessary to give effect to the rule. The rule simply enables a party, when sued, to
object if a second action is being brought against him or his property, or if he is
being sued personally without prior or simultaneous proceedings to take advantage of
property securing the obligation. In this case, the owners, having assumed no
personal liability, had not previously been sued personally, and were not being so
sued, and there had been no previous proceedings against any of their property.
When the creditor brought his first action, against the principal alone, the obliga-
tion had ceased to be secured, by reason of the return by the principal to the
creditor of the property the purchase of which gave rise to the obligation, so that
there had been no omission, in connection with any of the various steps of the
litigation, to take advantage of security put up by the principal. The owners of
[Vol. 10
SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY
contract is not secured, and proceedings may be had against him without
regard to the property. 50 The same distinction would seem to prevail in
cases where security is taken from other secondary parties, assuming that
the facts are such that the guarantors, among themselves, can be regarded
as liable upon different contracts.1 'r
19. ATTACHMENT
There is no special problem in regard to attachment under any of the
Field codes, but the reasoning used in connection with the preceding topic
leads to a similar distinction between suretyships and guaranties in Cali-
fornia and Montana. 52 In these States, under certain conditions, attach-
ment can not be had if the obligation is secured by mortgage, deed of trust,
lien or pledge.158 If such security is taken from the principal alone, or
from another secondary party, attachment remains possible against guaran-
tors, but not against sureties. 15 4
the property covered by the deed were not in position to complain that their prop-
erty had not been proceeded against prior to the present action. As to their
property the present suit was the single action permitted by the "but one action"
rule. The portion of the opinion in this case which is quoted supra is set forth
in Craiglow v. Williams, 45 Cal.App. 514, 517, 188 Pac. 76, 77 (1920). While
the latter opinion is obscure, in the use made of the passage it seems either to
constitute dictum or to be misapplied.
In Knowles v. Sandbrock, 107 Cal. 629, 642, 40 Pac. 1047, 1050 (1895), there is
reasoning which, standing by itself, would indicate that no party to a contract other
than the one giving a mortgage or deed of trust could take advantage of the "but
one action" rule. And yet, in the course of the reasoning, it is stated that the
parties involved were not sureties, making possible the inference that, if they had
been, a different rule would have been applied. The action was one against stock-
holders to enforce their liability as such for the debts of a mortgagor corporation.
Mr. Justice Temple said: "The mortgage only affects the remedy against the
mortgagor-the corporation. The liability of the stockholder, as has already been
said, is primary in the sense that he is not a surety. He is not injured nor is he
benefited by the fact that the corporation has given security." It seems that the
real ground of the decision is that the stockholders are not parties to, or liable
upon, the contract of the corporation as such, but upon a different liability created
by statute, to which the "but one action" rule clearly is not applicable. At 107 Cal.
p. 638, 40 Pac. p. 1049, it had been pointed out that the "stockholder is, perhaps,
not strictly liable on the contract, but on the statute."
To constitute the "one action" permitted, a suit must be on the debt; and not
a suit of some other character, such as replevin, Harper v. Gordon, 128 Cal. 489,
61 Pac. 84 (1900), or unlawful detainer. Schehr v. Berkey, 166 Cal. 157, 135 Pac.
41 (1913); Toplitz v. Standard Co., 25 Cal.App. 575, 143 Pac. 52 (1914); Ashcroft
Estate Co. v. Nelson, 26 Cal.App. 400, 147 Pac. 101 (1915). Therefore, after such
an action as detinue or unlawful detainer, another may be brought against a debtor
or his property.
'
50 Loeb v. Christie, 6 Cal.(2d) 416, 57 Pac.(2d) 1303 (1936). This case in-
volved a trust deed. Others relating to mortgages are cited in the opinion.
'
51The further assumption is involved that all the secondary par-ties are guaran-
tors. If some were sureties, the effect upon the guarantors of the taking of se-
curity from them would be the same as though it had been taken from the
principal.
162 The statement in regard to the existence of the distinction in Montana is
based upon the persuasiveness in that State of code interpretations by the Cali-
fornia courts.
'
53 Cal.Code Civ.Proc.(1935), §537(1); Mont.Rev.Code (1935), §9256. The
Montana provision omits reference to deeds of trust.
15 4As to guaranties, see Kelley v. Goldschmidt, 47 Cal.App. 38, 190 Pac. 55
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In California and Montana it is also provided that, under certain cir-
cumstances, attachment may issue upon a contract for the "direct" payment
of money.' 55  The reasoning that the surety is liable upon the same contract
as the principal, and the guarantor upon a separate contract, would seem to
lead to the conclusion that the obligation of the surety is direct, and that of
the guarantor indirect. Such a distinction has been drawn in Montana,150
but in California "direct" was early interpreted to mean "liquidated."''1
20. cONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENTS
The following section appears in the chapter on suretyship, with no
corresponding provision in the chapter on "Guaranty in general" :15
"2838.159 Notwithstanding the recovery of judgment by a
creditor against a surety, the latter still occupies the relation of
surety."
The following section, applying only to sureties, appears in the chapter
on indemnity in the Field Code:
"2778.160 In the interpretation of a contract of indemnity,
the following rules are to be applied, unless a contrary intention
appears: . . .
"6. If the person indemnifying, whether he is a principal or
surety in the agreement, has not reasonable notice of the action or
proceeding against the person indemnified, or is not allowed to
control its defense, judgment against the latter is only presumptive
evidence against the former;
Apart from the Field Code provisions, the following appears in the
California and Montana Codes of Civil Procedure:
(1920). Dictum in this case to the effect that the law is different as to sureties is
quoted in footnote #149, supra.
The text statement refers to a suit by the creditor, or someone basing his suit
upon subrogation to the creditor's position, and assumes that, if the security has
been put up by another guarantor, the facts are such that the various guarantors
can be regarded as liable upon separate contracts. The same assumption is necessary
in connection with a suit by one guarantor against another after a third guarantor
has put up security.
15 5Cal.Code Civ.Proc.(1935), §537(); Mont.Rev.Code (1935), §9256.
15 6State v. Reynolds, 68 Mont. 572, 220 Pac. 525 (1923). rTo be "direct" the
liability of the surety must also be neither uncertain as to amount nor conditional.
Ancient Order of Hibernians v. Sparrow, 29 Mont. 132, 74 Pac. 197, 101 Am.St.Rep.
563, 1 Ann.Cas. 144, 64 L.R.A. 128 (1903); Wall v. Brookman, 72 Mont. 228, 232
Pac. 774 (1925).
157Hathaway v. Davis, 33 Cal. 161, 168 (1867). In rejecting the suggestion
set forth in the text, Mr. Justice Sanderson said: "To read 'direct as the opposite
to 'collateral,' would be to create a distinction of very doubtful foundation and
certainly opposed to the general policy of the Act. To so read it would be to
exempt all collateral contracts from the operation of the Act. Indorsers, guarantors,
sureties and all others who undertake to pay or become responsible for the debts
of another could not be reached by attachment; and yet there can be no good
reason why they should be excepted. We are of the opinion that the Legislature
intended no such distinction."
1 5PAs to titles in States other than California, see footnote #18, supra.
159Field §1562; Mont. §8199; N.D. §6679; Okla. §5151; S.D. §1502.
360Field §1530; Mont. §8169; N.D. §6647; Okla. §5177; S.D. §1470.
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"1912.11 Whenever, pursuant to the last four sections, a
party is bound by a record, and such party stands in the relation
of a surety for another, the latter is also bound from the time that
he has notice of the action or proceedings, and an opportunity at
the surety's request to join in the defense."
It may be safely assumed that the expressio unis canon,1 62 notwithstand-
ing its logical applicability, will not be given any effect in connection with
any of the foregoing provisions.
21. EQUITABLE REMEDIES
Again it is safe to assume that the logical requirements of the expressio
unis doctrine' 63 will not be permitted to have any practical- consequences.
There are a number of sections in the chapter on suretyship relating to
contribution,'6 4 exoneration, 65 indemnity, 66 and subrogation, 67 with no
corresponding provisions in the chapter on "Guaranty in general.' 168
22. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
There are no problems relating to sureties and guarantors upon nego-
tiable instruments in the States having the Field Code provisions that do
not exist generally. The problems that exist arise out of principles of the
law of negotiable instruments, and once it has been determined that a party
upon such an instrument is to be treated as a guarantor or surety the effects
are the same as in other connections. The problems have to do with
whether parol evidence may be used to show that an apparent principal upon
a negotiable instrument is a secondary party, whether, under the Negotiable
Instruments Law, suretyship principles can be applied to one who signs ex-
pressly as surety, and whether one who places a guaranty upon the back
of a negotiable instrument is to be held as guarantor or indorser, or both.
161Cal.Code Civ.Proc.(1935); Mont.Rev.Code (1935), §10562.
'
62See III. The Role of Expressio Unis, at footnote #65, supra.
'
63 See III. The Role of Expressio Unis, at footnote #65, supra.
164Field §1569; Cal. §2848; Mont. §8206; N.D. §6686; Okla. §5158; S.D. §1509.
Professor Merrill has ably criticized the doctrine which has been given some
recognition in other States, that there can be no contribution between sureties and
guarantors. Merrill, Contribution Between Sureties and Guarantors. 2 Idaho
L. Jour. 1, 8 (1932), 2 Okla. State Bar Jour., #12, p.15 (1932).
'
65Field §1567; Cal. §2846; Mont. §8204; N.D. §6684; Okla. §5156; S.D. §1507.
It is provided also that, where property of both principal and surety is hypothecated,
the surety may require that the property of the principal be taken first. Field
§1571; Cal. §2850; Mont. §8208; N.D. §6688; Okla. §5160; S.D. §1511.
'
66 Field §1568; Cal. §2847; Mont. §8205; N.D. §6685; Okla. §5157; S.D. §1508.
Implied obligations of indemnity are in their essence equitable. Stearns on Surety-
ship (Feinsinger's 4th ed. 1934), 503, §279.
167Field §§1569, 1570 & 1572; Cal. §§2848, 2849 & 2854; Mont. §§8206, 8207
& 8209; N.D. §§6686, 6687 & 6689; Okla. §§5158, 5159 & 5161; S.D. §§1509, 1510
& 1512.
16SAs to titles in States other than California, see footnote #18, 4upra.
§§2819 & 2824 (Field §§1551 & 1556; Mont. §§8188 & 8193; N.D. §§6668 & 6673;
Okla. §§5140 & 5145; S.D. §§1491 & 1496), in the latter chapter, prevent discharge
of guarantors through alterations, insofar as they have been indemnified by the
principal.
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23. SUMMARY OF EFFECTS
Upon dissection, the distinction between suretyship and guaranty is
vapid. Making reasonable assumptions as to the interpretation of code pro-
visions, the effects which have been found under the Field Code resolve
themselves into the following:
(1) Parol evidence may be used to establish that an apparent principal
is a surety, but not that he is a guarantor.169
(2) In North and South Dakota sureties upon official bonds, at least,
are distinguished from guarantors in regard to date of maturity of obli-
ation. 70
(3) In South Dakota notice by the creditor of acceptance of an offer
to assume secondary liability is necessary in the case of guaranties, but not
in connection with suretyships.1' 1
(4) The doctrine of Pain. v. Packard applies to sureties, but not to
guarantors. 72
Apart from the Field Code provisions, we have the following additional
effects, in one or more of the five States under consideration:
(5) In California and Montana there seems to be a distinction as to
whether an impairment of the secondary party's remedies results under
certain circumstances if security is taken from another party subsequent to
the execution of the obligation.173
(6) In Montana it is held that only a surety may be joined with the
principal as defendant. 7 4
(7) In California and Montana a distinction arises in connection with
the "but one action" rule when a mortgage or deed of trust is taken from
another party.'75
(8) In California and Montana there is a difference in regard to the
availability of attachment when certain forms of security are taken from
other parties. 76
(9) In Montana the obligation of a surety is "direct," for purposes of
attachment, but not that of a guarantor.177
It should be pointed out also that, as long as the distinction under con-
sideration appears upon the statute books, whenever in any legal provision
the term "surety" is used, without "guarantor", or vice versa, a potential
source of danger exists. The question is always pertinent whether a dis-
169See IV. 1. Parol Evidence, at footnote # 81, supra.
17 OSee IV. 7. Date of Maturity, at footnotes ##106 & 107, supra.171See IV. 9. Notice of Acceptance, at footnote #113, supra.172See IV. 14. Request to Proceed Against Principal, at footnotes ##130-132,
.supra.
'
78See IV. 11. Alterations, at footnotes ##119-123, supra.
'
74See IV. 17. Joinder with Principal, at footnote #143, supra.175See IV. 18. Proceeding First Against Security to Creditor from OtherParties, at footnotes ##147-151, supra. Deeds of Trust are omitted in Montana.176See IV. 19. Attachment, at footnotes ##152-154, supra.
177See IV. 19. Attachment, at footnote #156, supra.
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tinction is intended. Indices disclose that there are many statutes of this
sort. Provisions outside the Field Code have been referred to only where
effects of the distinction have been found to exist.
V. PROPOSED CODIFICATORY ABOLITION
A distinction so formidable upon first impression, so difficult of applica-
tion and so empty in effective content, should not be retained in the law.
It creates confusion and requires great expenditures of effort upon the part
of judges and practitioners, with almost infinitesimal results. From the
standpoint of legal science the situation is intolerable. Professor Radin says
of the distinction:
"It is in the highest degree unfortunate that the decision of any
case should be allowed to turn upon the whimsy of a Pennsyl-
vania or Massachusetts judge of nearly a century ago. It has no
roots in the past. It has no sense in the present. If it is dis-
regarded-as it is in many jurisdictions-it will clear the subject
of a portentous amount of confused phrases and economize effort
in investigating, besides avoiding the obvious injustice of refusing
or granting relief on so insubstantial a basis. '178
A draft of a proposed recodification of that portion of the law, designed
to abolish the distinction, will be set forth. The- draft has been prepared
with as little violence as possible to the form of existing provisions. All
matters previously set forth in the code are covered by the draft, as it seems
inadvisable to return to the field of case-made law matters which have been
in statutory form for a considerable period of time. The present section
numbers have been retained, at the expense, because of omissions, of pre-
venting the numbers from being consecutive.179 The proposed section num-
bering for States other than California is shown in the footnotes.
When terms have become established in legal usage, it is futile to
attempt to supplant them, or to restrict their use. Therefore no new
terminology is suggested. Rather the familiar terms are made interchange-
able. "Surety" has been employed in preference to "guarantor," except
where there has been a special usage of the latter in a particular connection,
as with guaranties of collection and continuing guaranties. In these situa-
tions it has been felt that to attempt to depart from familiar language would
increase rather than diminish confusion. In expressing his preference for
suretyship terminology, Professor Williston says:
"The English terminology of calling any obligor a surety who is
liable in any form for the debt of another not only is in inveterate
common use in America also, but is intrinsically the better since
it centers attention on the one vital point that the debt as between
principal and surety is the debt of the principal. Most of the
peculiar rules of suretyship in any form, whether of guaranty or
otherwise, are based on this relation of the principal debtor to the
surety and not on any difference in the form of contract which the
178Radin, Guaranty & Suretyship, 18 CAL.L.REv. 21, 30 (1929).
17DIn California, the numbering has not been consecutive.
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surety makes with the creditor. It is desirable to have a single
word which includes all cases where the relation in question
exists."'180
"Surety" is the more commonly used term; and, in view of the increasing
importance of surety companies and surety bonds, it is believed that the
relative predominance of the word will, in any event, increase rather than
diminish. Preference for this term is also in harmony with the practice
of the courts, previously discussed, 8 1 normally to assume, when the way
is left open under the facts to do so, that a secondary obligation is one of
suretyship rather than of guaranty.
Should not advantage be taken of the opportunity presented by revi-
sion, to introduce other improvements into the law, in addition to abolition
of the suretyship-guaranty distinction? In an endeavor to accomplish this,
a number of changes have been inserted. They are almost entirely either
by way of clarification, or to settle definitely points upon which conflicts of
authority have arisen in other parts of the country. These additional modi-
fications of the law are not essential to the main purpose of the revision,
and easily can be eliminated, in whole or in part, if considered undesirable.
In addition to setting forth these proposed alterations in the following list,
only brief comment will be made in regard to them.sl"A The changes in-
serted, in addition to abolition of the distinction, are as follows:
(1) It is made clear that a promise to answer for a debt, default, or mis-
carriage of another need not be in writing where there is consideration to
the secondary promisor, even though the promise is made at the time of
execution of the principal obligation.182
(2) Where notice of acceptance of the suretyship obligation is not ex-
pressly required, it is made possible to accept an offer to become a surety
by acting upon it.183
(3) The position of the surety, where there are defenses in behalf of
the principal, is clarified; and the recovery back by the creditor of a res
which has been transferred is prevented from terminating the surety's
liability.'84
(4) The established practice of implying the surety's consent to certain
alterations is incorporated in the code.' 8 5
(5) The doctrine of express reservation of rights is abolished. 180
(6) The rule that a void or voidable promise by a creditor can not con-
stitute an alteration discharging the surety is eliminated. 187
(7) In connection with the use of parol evidence to establish that a
1804 Williston, Contracts (rev.ed. 1936), 3484, §1211.
'
81 See I. The Statement of the Distinction, at footnotes ##13, 22 & 23,
supra.
lalAOne of the authors of this article plans to treat of these changes in greater
detail in a subsequent article.
182See §2794(4), in text at footnote #210, infra.
183See §2795, in text, at footnote #212, infra.
184See §2810, in text, at footnote #232, infra.
185See §2819, in text, at footnote #240, infra.
186See §2819, in text, at footnote #240, infra.187This is accomplished through the repeal of the present §2820 (Field §1552;
Mont. §8189; N.D. §6669; Okla. §5141; S.D. §1492).
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party is a surety, it is made unnecessary to prove that the creditor accepted
him as such. 88
(8) The position of a compensated surety is made the same as that of
one who is gratuitous. 89
(9) The Pain v. Packard doctrine is abolished. 190
To effect the abolition of the distinction between suretyship and guar-
anty, and to make the foregoing changes, the existing Sections 2820,1s '
2831,192, 2836,193 28409-1 and 2844195 should be repealed. The other Sec-
tions from 2787 to 2854196 should be retained, either in their present or in
amended form, so that the body of code provisions on suretyship and
guaranty'9 7 will read as follows:
TITLE XIII. 9 8 SURETYSHIp
ARTICLE I. DEFINITION OF SURETYSHIP 199
2787.200 Suretyship and guaranty, what.2 0°A The distinction
between sureties and guarantors is hereby abolished. The terms
188 See §2832, in text, at footnote #256, infra.189See §2837, in text, at footnote #258, infra.
'
90See §2845, in text, at footnote #264, infra.
191Field §1552; Mont. §8189; N.D. §6669; Okla. §5141; S.D. §1492. This sec-
tion provides that a void or voidable promise by a creditor does not constitute an
alteration which will discharge a surety. The rule is wrong, because the natural
consequence of such a promise is to cause the principal not to perform, and thus to
increase the risks of the surety.
19 2Field §1558; Mont. §8195; N.D. §6675; Okla. §5147; S.D. §1498. This sec-
tion defines a surety.
19 3Field §1560; Mont. §8197; N.D. §6677; Okla. §5149; S.D. §1500. This sec-
tion reads as follows: "A surety cannot be held beyond the express terms of
his contract, and if such contract prescribes a penalty for its breach, he cannot in
any case be liable for more than the penalty." The provision is innocuous, except
that it indicates that implications usual in the interpretation of contracts cannot be
made as to sureties. If the provision as to penalties refers to liquidated damages,
it is erroneous; if it purports to make penal provisions enforceable, it should be
repealed.
194Field §1564; Mont. §8201; N.D. §6681; Okla. §5153; S.D. §1504. This sec-
tion provides that a surety is exonerated in like manner with a guarantor, and in
other respects either in substance duplicates the provisions of §2819 (Field §1551;
Mont. §8188; N.D. §6668; Okla. §5140; S.D. §1491), or supports the Pain v. Packard
rule, which is abolished through amendment of §2845 (Field §1566; Mont. §8203;
N.D. §6683; Okla. §5155; S.D. §1506).
19 5Field §1565; Mont. §8202; N.D. §6682; Okla. §5154; S.D. §1505. This sec-
tion provides that a surety has all the rights of a guarantor.
196Field §§1534-1572; Mont. §§8171-8209; N.D. §§6651-6689; Okla. §§5123-5161;
S.D. §§1474-1512.
197Letters of credit, which are covered in §§2858-2866 (Field §§1573-1581;
Mont. §§8210-8218; N.D. §§6690-6698; Okla. §§5162-5170; S.D. §§1513-1521), are
omitted. These code provisions as to letters of credit are innocuous, but an
improvement would be effected by removal of the bracketed words from §2860
(Field §1575; Mont. §8212; N.D. §6692; Okla. §5164; S.D. §1523), which reads
as follows: "The writer of a letter of credit is [, upon the default of the debtor,]
liable to those who gave credit in compliance with its terms." The bracketed words
are not in harmony with the chief distinguishing characteristic of a letter of credit,
that the issuer is liable for payment in the first instance. There should be no
indication that default by the purchaser of the letter is a part of the plaintiff
creditor's case.
198Mont. c.174; N.D. c.84; Okla. Art.VIII; S.D. c.13.199Article titles to be omitted in Montana and Oklahoma.200Mont. §8171; N.D. §6651; Okla. §5123; S.D. §1474.
200AAs to section titles, see footnote #1, supra.
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and their derivatives, wherever used in this code or in any other
statute or law of this State now in force or hereafter enacted, shall
have the same meaning, as hereafter in this section defined. A
surety or guarantor is one who promises to answer for the debt,
default or miscarriage of another, or hypothecates property as
security therefor. Guaranties of collection and continuing guar-
anties are forms of suretyship obligations, and, except insofar as
necessary in order to give effect to provisions specially relating
thereto, shall be subject to all provisions of law relating to surety-
ships in general.20 1
2788.202 Knowledge of principal not necessary to creation of
suretyship. A person may become surety even without the knowl-
edge or consent of the principal. 20 3
ARTICLE II. CREATION OF SURETYSHIP
20 4
2792.205 Necessity of a consideration. Where a suretyship
obligation is entered into at the same time with the original obliga-
tion, or with the acceptance of the latter by the creditor, and forms
with that obligation a part of the consideration to him, no other
consideration need exist. In all other cases there must be a con-
sideration distinct from that of the original obligation.200
2793.207 Suretyship to be in writing, etc. Except as pre-
scribed by the next section, a suretyship obligation must be in
writing, and signed by the surety; but the writing need not express
a consideration. 20 8
2794.209 Engagement to answer for the obligation of another,
when deemed original. A promise to answer for the obligation
of another, in any of the following cases, is deemed an original
obligation of the promisor, and need not be in writing:
(1) Where the promise is made by one who has received
property of another upon an undertaking to apply it pursuant to
such promise; or by one who has received a discharge from an
obligation in whole or in part, in consideration of such promise;
(2) Where the creditor parts with value, or enters into an
obligation, in consideration of the obligation in respect to which
the promise is made, in terms or under circumstances such as to
render the party making the promise the principal debtor, and the
person in whose behalf it is made, his surety;
2 0 1The last sentence is inserted in an, endeavor to prevent any expressio i011s
or other confusing inferences from the retention of guaranty terminology, because
of familiar usage, in these two connections.2 0 2Mont. §8172; N.D. §6652;. Okla. §5124; S.D. §1475.2 0 3This section has been changed only through the substitution of suretyship
terminology for guaranty.2 0 4Article titles to be omitted in Montana and Oklahoma.2 0 5Mont. §8173; N.D. §6653; Okla. §5125; S.D. §1476.2 06This section has been changed only through the substitution of suretyship
terminology for guaranty.207Mont. §8174; N.D. §6654; Okla. §5126; S.D. §1477.2 0 8This section has been changed only through the substitution of suretyship
terminology for guaranty.209Mont. §8175; N.D. §6655; Okla. §5127; S.D. §1478.
1.
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(3) Where the promise, being for an antecedent obligation
of another, is made upon the consideration that the party receiving
it cancels the antecedent obligation, accepting the new promise as
a substitute therefor; or upon the consideration that the party re-
ceiving it releases the property of another from a levy, or his
person from imprisonment under an execution on a judgment ob-
tained upon the antecedent obligation;
(4) Where the promise is upon a consideration beneficial to
the promisor, whether moving from either party to the antecedent
obligation, or from another person ;210
(5) Where a factor undertakes, for a commission, to sell
merchandise and act as surety in connection with the sale ;211
(6) Where the holder of an instrument for the payment of
money, upon which a third person is or may become liable to him,
transfers it in payment of a precedent debt of his own, or for a
new consideration, and in connection with such transfer enters into
a promise respecting such instrument.
2795.212 Acceptance of Suretyship. Unless notice of accept-
ance is expressly required, an offer to become a surety may be
accepted by acting upon it, or by acceptance upon other consider-
ation. An absolute suretyship obligation is binding upon the surety
without notice of acceptance.21 3
ARTICLE III. INTERPRETATION OF SURETYSHIP
2 14
2799.215 Suretyship of incomplete contract. In an assump-
tion of liability as surety in connection with a contract the terms
of which are not then settled, it is implied that its terms shall be
such as will not expose the surety to greater risks than he would
incur under those terms which are most common in similar con-
tracts at the place where the principal contract is to be per-
formed. 2
18
2800.211 Guaranty of collection. A guaranty to the effect
that an obligation is good, or is collectable, imports that the debtor
is solvent, and that the demand is collectable by the usual legal
proceedings, if taken with reasonable diligence.218
21OSubdivision 4 represents a change in the form of the corresponding final
portion of subdivision 3 in the Field Code (§1538), in order to remove the limita-
tion of the rule to antecedent obligations. It has been so confined through the
operation of the expressio unis canon.211Subdivision 5 has been changed through the substitution of suretyship
terminology for guaranty.212Mont. §8176; N.D. §656; Okla. §5128; S.D. §1479.213This is substituted for the present form of the section, reading as follows:
"A mere offer to guaranty is not binding, until notice of its acceptance is communi-
cated by the guarantee to the guarantor; but an absolute guaranty is binding upon
the guarantor without notice of acceptance." It should be possible to accept an
offer to become a surety by shipping goods, for example, in reliance upon it.214Article titles to be omitted in Montana and Oklahoma.21GMont. §8177; N.D. §6657; Okla. §5129; S.D. §1480.216This section has been changed only through the substitution of suretyship
terminology for guaranty.217Mont. §8178; N.D. §6658; Okla. §5130; S.D. §1481.218This section is unchanged, except that, for simplification, the title set forth
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2801.219 Recovery upon such guaranty. A guaranty such as
is mentioned in the last section is not discharged by an omission
to take proceedings upon the principal debt, or upon any collateral
security for its payment, if no part of the debt could have been
collected thereby.220
2802.221 Guarantor's liability upon such guaranty. In the
cases mentioned in section two thousand eight hundred, the re-
moval of the principal from the State, leaving no property therein
from which the obligation might be satisfied, is equivalent to the
insolvency of the principal in its effect upon the rights and obliga-
tions of the guarantor. 2z2
ARTICLE IV. LIABILITY OF SURETIES
223
2806.22 Suretyship, how construed. A suretyship obligation
is to be deemed unconditional unless its terms import some con-
dition precedent to the liability of the surety.2
25
2807.226 Liability upon suretyship of payment or perform-
ance. A surety who has assumed liability for payment or per-
formance is liable to the creditor immediately upon the default of
the principal, and without demand or notice.227
2808.228 Liability upon suretyship of a conditional obligation.
Where one assumes liability as surety upon a conditional obligation,
his liability is commensurate with that of the principal, and he is
not entitled to notice of the default of the principal, unless he is
unable, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, to acquire informa-
tion of such default, and the creditor has actual notice thereof. 22-
2809.230 Obligation of surety cannot exceed that of the prin-
cipal. The obligation of a surety must be neither larger in amount
nor in other respects more burdensome than that of the principal;
and if in its terms it exceeds it, it is reducible in proportion to the
principal obligation.0 1
has been substituted for the present title, reading: "Guaranty that an obligation is
good or collectable."
It is felt that confusion would be increased rather than diminished by an
attempt to depart from established terminology in connection with guaranties of
collection. See §2787, in text, supra, and footnote #201, in connection therewith.210Mont. §8179; N.D. §6659; Okla. §5131; S.D. §1482.220This section is unchanged.
221Mont. §8180; N.D. §6660;. Okla. §5132; S.D. §1483.222This section is unchanged.
223Article titles to be omitted in Montana and Oklahoma.22 Mont. §8181; N.D. §6661; Okla. §5133; S.D. §1484.225This section has been changed only through the substitution of suretyship
terminology for guaranty.226Mont. §8182; N.D. §6662; Okla. §5134; S.D. §1485.227This section has been changed only through the substitution of suretyship
terminology for guaranty.228Mont. §8183; N.D. §6663; Okla. §5135; S.D. §1486.229This section has been changed only through the substitution of suretyship
terminology for guaranty.23OMont. §8184; N.D. §6664; Okla. §5136; S.D. §1487.23lThis section has been changed only through the substitution of suretyship
terminology for guaranty.
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2810.232 Surety not liable on an illegal contract. A surety is
liable notwithstanding any mere personal disability of the principal,
though the disability be such as to make the contract void against
the principal; but he is not liable if for any other reason there is
no liability upon the part of the principal at the time of the execu-
tion of the contract, or the liability of the principal thereafter
ceases, unless the surety has assumed liability with knowledge of
the existence of the defense. Where the principal is not liable be-
cause of mere personal disability, recovery back by the creditor of
any res which formed all or part of the consideration for the con-
tract shall have the effect upon the liability of the surety which is
attributed to the recovery back of such a res under the law of
sales generally.2 33
ARTICLE V. CONTINUING GUARANTY
2 34
2814.235 Continuing guaranty, what. A guaranty relating to
a future liability of the principal, under successive transactions,
which either continue his liability or from time to time renew it
after it has been satisfied, is called a continuing guaranty.
23 6
2815.237 Revocation. A continuing guaranty may be re-
voked at any time by the guarantor, in respect to future trans-
actions, unless there is a continuing consideration as to such
transactions which he does not renounce.ms
ARTICLE VI. EXONERATION OF SURETIES2 3 9
2819.240 What dealings with debtor exonerate surety. A
surety is exonerated, except so far as he may be indemnified by
the principal, if by any act of the creditor, without the consent of
the surety, the original obligation of the principal is altered in any
respect, or the remedies or rights of the creditor against the prin-
cipal, in respect thereto, in any way impaired or suspended, except,
as to any of the foregoing, insofar as the surety's consent thereto
may be reasonably implied.2 40A In the absence of express contract
provision or statement in advance by the surety to the contrary,
and facts reasonably negativing implication of consent, the surety's
2-32Mont. §8185; N.D. §6665; Okla. §5137; S.D. §1488.
2 3 The section in its present form, in addition to covering satisfactorily per-
sonal disability of the principal, reads: "A guarantor is not liable if the contract
of the principal is unlawful . . ." This has been clarified, to remove the
expressio rims inference that the surety would be liable notwithstanding the existence
of defenses in favor of the principal other than illegality and those relating to
personal disability.
284Article titles to be omitted in Montana and Oklahoma.235Mont. §8186; N.D. §6666; Okla. §5138; S.D. §1489.
28GThis section is unchanged. It is felt that confusion would be increased
rather than diminished by an attempt to depart from established terminology in
connection with continuing guaranties. See §2787, in text, supra, and footnote #201,
in connection therewith.237Mont. §8187; N.D. §6667; Okla. §5139; S.D. §1490.28sThis section is unchanged.
289Article titles to be omitted in Montana and Oklahoma.240Mont. §8188; N.D. §6668; Okla. §5140; S.D. §1491.240AThe exception at the end inserts the doctrine of implied consent, setting
forth the result usually attained through judicial construction.
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consent shall be implied in connection with extensions of time,241
addition of principal obligors or secondary parties, 242 and lending
of money in an amount larger or smaller than that provided for.2 48
The preceding sentence shall not be interpreted to restrict the im-
plication of consent in other connections. An express reservation
of rights shall not continue the surety's liability under circum-
stances such that it would otherwise be terminated.2 44
2821.245 Rescission of alteration. The rescission of an agree-
ment altering the original obligation of a debtor, or impairing the
remedy of a creditor, does not restore the liability of a surety who
has been exonerated by such agreement.2 46
2822.247 Part performance. The acceptance, by a creditor, of
anything in partial satisfaction of an obligation, reduces the obli-
gation of a surety thereof, in the same measure as that of the
principal, but does not otherwise affect it.248
2823.249 Delay of creditor does not discharge surety. Mere
delay on the part of a creditor to proceed against the principal, or
to enforce any other remedy, does not exonerate a surety.2 0
2824.251 Surety indemnified by the debtor, not exonerated.
A surety, who has been indemnified by the principal, is liable to the
creditor to the extent of the indemnity, notwithstanding that the
creditor, without the assent of the surety, may have modified the
contract or released the principal.2 52
241Discharge of sureties because of extensions of time granted to the principal
debtor is based, as others have pointed out, upon the absurd assumption that the
surety is eager to perform at maturity, in order to obtain rights of subrogation
and indemnity. Cardozo, Nature of the Judicial Process (1921), 153.2
=-Unless the parties added are sureties, and are so irresponsible financially
as to impair the right of contribution, in which event the special circumstances
negative implication of consent, as provided for in the text, it would be a very
unusual situation where a surety, if contacted, would not welcome the addition
of other parties.243Unless there is some special reason why the principal should be advanced
the exact sum mentioned in the contract, in which event the special circumstances
will create an exception, as provided for in the text, the surety should not be dis-
charged because of a departure from the terms of the agreement.244The highly artificial reasoning upon which the doctrine of express reserva-
tion of rights is based should not be permitted longer to continue its existence.
The first sentence of the section is changed through the substitution of surety-
ship terminology for guaranty, and the insertion of the exception at the end.
The remaining sentences of the section are new.§2820 (Mont. §8189; N.D. §6669; Okla. §5141; S.D. §1492), providing that a
void or voidable promise of a creditor shall not discharge a guarantor, is repealed
through omission. See text, supra, at footnote #187.245Mont. §8190; N.D. §6670; Okla. §5142; S.D. §1493.246This section has been changed only through the substitution of suretyship
terminology for guaranty.247Mont. §8191; N.D. §6671; Okla. §5143; S.D. §1494.248This section has been changed only through the substitution of suretyship
terminology for guaranty.249Mont. §8192; N.D. §6672; Okla. §5144; S.D. §1495.25
°This section has been changed only through the substitution of suretyship
terminology for guaranty.
251vont. §8193; N.D. §6673; Okla. §5145; S.D. §1496.
252This section has been changed only through the substitution of suretyship
terminology for guaranty.
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2825.253 Discharge of principal by act of law does not dis-
charge surety. A surety is not exonerated by the discharge of
his principal by operation of law, without the intervention or
omission of the creditor.2
54
ARTICLE VII. POSITION OF SURETIES2 5 5
2832.256 Apparent principal may show that he is surety. One
who appears to be a principal, whether by the terms of a written
instrument or otherwise, may show that he is in fact a surety, ex-
cept as against persons who have acted on the faith of his apparent
character of principal. It is not necessary for him to show that the
creditor accepted him as surety.
257
2837.258 Rules of interpretation. In interpreting the terms
of a contract of suretyship, the same rules are to be observed as
in the case of other contracts. Except as provided in section two
thousand seven hundred and ninety-four, the position of a surety
to whom consideration moves is the same as that of one who is
gratuitous. 2
5 9
2838.260 Judgment against surety does not alter the relation.
Notwithstanding the recovery of judgment by a creditor against a
surety, the latter still occupies the relation of surety.261
2839.262 Surety exonerated by performance or offer of per-
formance. Performance of the principal obligation, or an offer of
such performance, duly made as provided in this code, exonerates
a surety.
263
2845.264 Surety may require the creditor to proceed against
the principal. If the contract expressly so provides, but not other-
wise, a surety may require his creditor to proceed against the prin-
253Mont. §8194; N.D. §6674; Okla. §5146; S.D. §1497.254This section has been changed only through the substitution of suretyship
terminology for guaranty.25 5Article titles to be omitted in Montana and Oklahoma.
This article, with a title meaningless from the standpoint of delimitation,
has been created in order to provide a place for the sections previously in the
chapter on Suretyship which it is necessary to carry forward. As to chapter
divisions in Montana, see footnote #18, supra.§2831, defining a surety, has been omitted.25SMont. §8196; N.D. §6676; Okla. §5148; S.D. §1499.25TThe first sentence is unchanged. The second sentence has been inserted.
Unreasonable limitation of the use of parol evidence in this connection should be
prevented.§2836 (Mont. §8197; N.D. §6677; Okla. §5149; S.D. §1500) has been repealed
through omission. See footnote #193, supra.25sMont. §8198; N.D. §6678; Okla. §5150; S.D. §1501.259The first sentence is unchanged. 'The second sentence has been inserted.
See text, supra, at footnotes ##31 & 33, and said footnotes.200Mont. §8199; N.D. §6679; Okla. §5151; S.D. §1502.261This section is unchanged.262Mont. §8200; N.D. §6680; Okla. §5152; S.D. §1503.263This section is unchanged.
§§2840 & 2844 (Mont. §§8201 & 8202; N.D. §§6681 & 6682; Okla. §§5153 &
5154; S.D. §§1504 & 1505) have been omitted. See text, supra, at footnotes ##194
& 195, and said footnotes.264Mont. §8203; N.D. §6683; Okla. §5155; S.D. §1506.
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cipal, or to pursue any other remedy in his power which the surety
can not himself pursue, and which would lighten his burden; and if
in such case the creditor neglects to do so, the surety is exonerated
to the extent to which he is thereby prejudiced. 26 5
2846.266 Surety may compel principal to perform obligation,
when due. A surety may compel his principal to perform the obli-
gation when due.267
2847.268 A principal bound to reimburse his surety. If a
surety satisfies the principal obligation, or any part thereof, whether
with or without legal proceedings, the principal is bound to reim-
burse what he has disbursed, including necessary costs and ex-
penses; but the surety has no claim for reimbursement against
other persons, though they may have been benefited by his act, ex-
cept as prescribed by the next section. 209
2848.270 The- surety acquires the right of the creditor. A
surety, upon satisfying the obligation of the principal, is entitled
to enforce every remedy which the creditor then has against the
principal to the extent of reimbursing what he has expended, and
also to require all his co-sureties to contribute thereto, without re-
gard to the order of time in which they became such.271
2849.272 Surety entitled to benefit of securities held by credi-
tor. A surety is entitled to the benefit of every security for the
performance of the principal obligation held by the creditor or a
co-surety at the time of entering into the contract of suretyship,
or acquired by him afterwards, whether the surety was aware of
the security or not.278
2850.274 The property of principal to be taken first. When-
ever property of a surety is hypothecated with property of the
principal, the surety is entitled to have the property of the principal
first applied to the discharge of the obligation.27 5
2854.276 Creditor entitled to benefit of securities held by
surety. A creditor is entitled to the benefit of everything which a
surety has received from the debtor by way of security for the per-
formance of the obligation, and may, upon the maturity of the ob-
ligation, compel the application of such security to its satisfac-
tion.277
265This section has been changed in order to eliminate the doctrine of Pain
v. Packard. It is felt that that object will be more certainly attained through
retention of the section in this form than by dropping it from the code. For
criticisms of Pain v. Packard, see Arant on Suretyship (1931), 317, §71; Stearns
on Suretyship (Feinsinger's 4th ed. 1934), 174, §115; Note, 37 Yale L.Jour. 971(1928).266Mont. §8204; N.D. §6684; Okla. §5156; S.D. §1507.287This section is unchanged.
268Mont. §8205; N.D. §6685; Okla. §5157; S.D. §1508.269This section is unchanged.
270Mont. §8206; N.D. §6686; Okla. §5158; S.D. §1509.271This section is unchanged.
272Mont. §8207; N.D. §6687; Okla. §5159; S.D. §1510.273This section is unchanged.
274Mont. §8208; N.D. §6688; Okla. §5160; S.D. §1511.275This section is unchanged.
276Mont. §8209; N.D. §6689; Okla. §5161; S.D. §1512.277This section is unchanged.
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